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volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock 
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Why is it that firms from some countries have higher stock return volatilities than firms from other 
countries? More specifically, why is it that U.S. firms have more volatile stock returns than similar firms 
from other countries? Commentators often attribute this high volatility to a casino mentality or to short-
termism.1 The finance literature offers additional reasons for why stock return volatility depends on 
country characteristics. In that literature, there exists both good volatility and bad volatility. A firm’s 
stock return volatility can be higher in a country because institutions in that country make it advantageous 
for firms to take risks that lead to greater economic growth (e.g., Acemoglu and Ziliboti (1997) and 
Obstfeld (1994)). Alternatively, a firm’s stock return volatility can be high because of country-specific 
forces, such as political risk, that impose risks on firms that they cannot shed. In the former case, 
volatility is good in that it results from conditions that enable firms to be more productive. In contrast, the 
bad volatility associated with the latter case can prevent growth and destabilize the economy.2 Whether a 
country’s stock return volatility is due to good or bad volatility is critically important in assessing policies 
that address stock return volatility since it is beneficial to reduce bad volatility but not good volatility. In 
this paper, after carefully documenting the higher volatility of U.S. firms, we show that this higher 
volatility is mostly due to good volatility. 
We show that across 20,069 firms over the 1990 to 2006 period, the annualized average weekly 
volatility of U.S. firms is 25.7% higher than that of foreign firms of same industry, size, age, and market-
to-book ratio. It is common to disaggregate volatility into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Using a 
model for systematic risk from Bekaert, Hodrick and Zhang (2010) that makes the return of a stock 
depend on the return of its country’s market, the world market, and Fama-French size and value factors 
for the region and the world, we find that almost all of the greater volatility of U.S. stocks is accounted 
for by greater idiosyncratic risk. Though investors can diversify idiosyncratic risk, it nevertheless plays an 
important role in all areas of finance. For example, idiosyncratic risk is important for the large numbers of 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, “On Tyler Cowen’s ‘The Great Stagnation’” by Robert Teitelman in The Deal, February 7, 2011. 
2 For concerns about the potential destabilizing impact of stock return volatility, see, for instance, the chapter titled 
“Financial asset price volatility: A source of instability?” in the Global Financial Stability Report of the IMF, fall 
2002. 
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investors who are imperfectly diversified. In asset pricing, there is increasing evidence that idiosyncratic 
risk is relevant for expected returns. In behavioral finance, theories emphasize the role of noise traders in 
pushing stock prices away from fundamentals, which makes them excessively volatile when noise traders 
are powerful because of limits to arbitrage. In corporate finance, agency problems in firms force insiders 
to co-invest with outside investors, so that firms in which agency problems are greater are expected to 
take less risk as more of it is born by insiders who cannot diversify it away. In the microstructure 
literature, idiosyncratic risk and illiquidity are closely related as market makers are more leery of taking 
positions in stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. In addition to the policy implications already mentioned, 
understanding why idiosyncratic risk differs across similar firms from different countries has implications 
throughout finance. 
A large literature is available to help guide our investigation into why U.S. stocks have greater 
volatility. We organize that literature into five groups of papers: 
i. Country risk. One theory is that greater country risk, in the form of a higher threat of 
expropriation and/or macroeconomic volatility, increases systematic risk (e.g., Acemoglu, et al. 
(2003)) and decreases the rewards to risk taking at the firm level. As a result, firms take fewer 
diversifiable risks in riskier countries. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) use country credit ratings as 
a proxy for political risk and do not find a consistent relation between stock market volatility 
and credit ratings for emerging countries. However, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) 
show for a sample of post-communist countries that weaker property rights lead to less 
entrepreneurial activity. An alternative theory is that country risk leads to more firm-specific 
shocks that firms cannot mitigate, thereby increasing idiosyncratic risk. Hence, while we 
would expect political risk to be associated with greater systematic risk, the relation between 
political risk and idiosyncratic risk is an empirical issue. 
ii. Investor protection. With better protection of minority shareholders, corporate insiders 
consume fewer private benefits. As John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) show, insiders’ claim on 
future private benefits is equivalent to a debt claim on the firm and hence leads them to take 
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fewer risks. We would therefore expect idiosyncratic risk to increase as shareholder protection 
improves. Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2008) show that better creditor protection can lead 
firms to take fewer risks, especially when managers are likely to lose their position in the event 
of a bankruptcy filing. In addition, with better investor protection, agency problems between 
insiders and outside providers of capital are better controlled, so that insiders do not have to 
co-invest as much and their wealth is less exposed to firm idiosyncratic risk, which leads firms 
to take more risks (Stulz (2005)). Disclosure is one dimension of investor protection. Prior 
literature argues that better disclosure leads stock prices to reflect more firm-specific 
information, which increases the importance of idiosyncratic shocks in explaining stock 
returns (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000)). 
iii. Financial development and openness. With greater financial development, risk can be shared 
more efficiently among firm owners, which means that idiosyncratic risk becomes less of an 
issue in making investment decisions, and access to outside funding is less costly, so that firms 
can cope more efficiently with unexpected shocks by raising funds. Consequently, firms 
become more willing to invest in riskier projects as financial development improves (for 
empirical evidence and references to the large theoretical literature, see, for instance, Thesmar, 
and Thoenig (2004) and Michelacci and Schivardi (2008)). In light of the arguments of 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2008) and others, these predictions might be more relevant for 
equity market development than credit market development. When credit is a more significant 
source of funding, we would expect creditors to have more influence on firm decisions and to 
limit risk taking by firms. Openness of the capital markets of a country leads to greater 
diversification opportunities for investors in that country, which makes it possible for firms to 
take more idiosyncratic risks (e.g., Obstfeld (1994)). Openness reduces the cost of capital for 
firms (e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (2000)), which increases firm valuations and makes growth 
opportunities profitable that otherwise would be left unexploited. Finally, openness enables 
better control of agency problems (e.g., Stulz (1999)). 
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iv. Disclosure and noise trading. LeRoy and Porter (1981) show that with market efficiency and 
constant discount rates, more information disclosure leads to less volatility. However, Jin and 
Myers (2007) develop a model in which more disclosure leads to more volatility because 
insiders’ concerns about private benefits make stocks less volatile. Further, a considerable 
literature emphasizes the impact of limits to arbitrage and shows that noise traders can 
influence stock prices and make stock returns more volatile. The literature does not make clear 
predictions on how the impact of noise trading should differ across countries. There seem to be 
opposing forces at work. With more financial development, we expect trading to be cheaper 
and limits to arbitrage weaker, so that stock prices would be closer to fundamental values.3 
However, noise traders can trade more cheaply in countries with lower trading costs, so that 
they could be more influential when trading is cheap. As Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2008) 
further argue, poor disclosure could make stock prices more volatile as there is more 
unresolved uncertainty about stock prices and hence more opportunities for investors to 
disagree. Finally, in open economies, there is often a concern that foreign investors are noise 
traders, perhaps because they herd, and make stock prices more volatile. 
v. Innovation and growth opportunities. In corporate finance, it is generally assumed that there 
are more information asymmetries about growth opportunities than about assets in place (e.g., 
Myers and Majluf (1984)). This difference would suggest that firms with more growth 
opportunities will be more volatile and in particular have more idiosyncratic volatility. Firms 
acquire growth opportunities through R&D, so that firms that invest more in R&D are 
expected to be more volatile. 4   In addition, we would expect more idiosyncratic risk in 
countries with more innovation because innovation constantly creates winners and losers. 
Further, countries with more innovation are countries where technological revolutions 
                                                 
3 Though Griffin, Kelly, and Nardari (2008) find that transaction costs are lower in more developed markets, they 
find no evidence that these markets are more efficient using common measures of efficiency. 
4 See Irvine and Pontiff (2009) and Comin and Philippon (2005) for papers that explain the increase in idiosyncratic 
risk by the increasing importance of R&D for American firms. 
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originate and such revolutions are associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility in their initial 
stages (Pastor and Veronesi (2009)). Countries with less corruption, less political risk, and 
better investor protection are expected to be more innovative. 
 
To investigate the impact of country risk, we use the political risk index of the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG).5 This index measures government quality as well as respect of property rights. It is 
computed so that a higher value corresponds to less risk and it is highly correlated with less frequently 
measured country governance indices such as those in Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). We find 
that countries with more political risk have more systematic risk. The evidence on the relation between 
political risk and idiosyncratic risk is ambiguous. 
Our measures of investor protection are the revised anti-director rights index of Djankov et al. (DLLS, 
2008), the creditor rights index of Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), and the disclosure index of Jin 
and Myers (2007). We find evidence that idiosyncratic risk increases with the anti-director index – but so 
does systematic risk. There is no relation between idiosyncratic risk and the creditor rights index. We also 
find a negative relation between the quality of disclosure and idiosyncratic risk. Our evidence is 
consistent with the prediction of LeRoy and Porter (1981) and evidence from the U.S. by Kelly (2007) 
and Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2008) that firms with a worse information environment are more volatile, 
but it is inconsistent with the view in the R2 literature that better disclosure is associated with higher 
idiosyncratic risk (see, for example, Jin and Myers (2007)). Though John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find a 
positive relation between country-level cross-sectional volatility in the ratio of EBITDA to total assets 
and a measure of accounting disclosure requiring five years of data for each firm, their result is not 
inconsistent with our evidence because their measure of risk can increase with the volatility of the 
systematic component in a firm’s EBITDA.6 
                                                 
5 The ICR Guide (ICRG) is published by The PRS Group, 6320 Fly Road, Suite 102, East Syracuse, NY 13057-
0248, USA. 
6 To see this, suppose that a market model holds for EBITDA/Assets. If all firms have the same beta, the risk 
measure of John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) just measures the idiosyncratic risk in EBITDA/Assets. However, 
suppose alternatively that the betas differ and there is no idiosyncratic risk. In that case, their measure at the firm 
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We proxy for equity market development using two common measures: stock market turnover (e.g., 
Levine and Zervos (1998)) and the ratio of stock market capitalization to the size of the economy (e.g., 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)). Idiosyncratic risk increases with turnover and stock market 
capitalization. There is no clear relation between stock market development and systematic risk. 
Idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk are negatively related to bond market development. For openness, 
we use a measure of capital account openness and a measure of equity market liberalization. Bekaert and 
Harvey (1997) find that stock market volatility falls following capital market liberalizations. We find 
further that capital account openness is strongly negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. There is no 
evidence that equity market liberalization is associated with higher idiosyncratic volatility, but there is a 
positive relation for systematic risk.  
To investigate the role of innovation and growth opportunities, we use both country-level variables 
and firm-level variables. Young firms are often viewed as more innovative. We find that both 
idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk are higher for younger firms. We also find that both risk measures 
are strongly related to a firm’s R&D share in investment (defined as the ratio of R&D to the sum of 
capital expenditures and R&D). In fact, in terms of economic significance, no country characteristic is 
more economically important than the R&D share. We would expect firms that have fewer assets in place 
and more growth opportunities to have a lower ratio of plant, property, and equipment to assets. We find a 
strong negative relation between the ratio of plant, property, and equipment to assets and risk. Since firms 
with higher market-to-book are firms with more growth opportunities, we would expect a positive relation 
between market-to-book and idiosyncratic volatility. We find a positive relation, but it is significant only 
for some estimation approaches. At the aggregate level, we find that countries with more patents per 
capita have more idiosyncratic risk (but not more systematic risk). Other firm characteristics are strongly 
related to idiosyncratic risk. In particular, idiosyncratic risk increases with leverage, but falls with asset 
size and debt maturity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
level is the absolute value of the market model beta of the firm minus one times the standard deviation of the 
country’s market factor in EBITDA. 
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A concern with our results is that differences in liquidity across countries could obscure or bias the 
relation between country characteristics and volatility. It could be that U.S. stocks are more volatile 
simply because U.S. stock markets are more liquid. We address this issue in several ways. First, as our 
returns data are weekly, we use screens for the fraction of weeks with zero local currency returns. We find 
that the greater volatility of U.S. stocks holds irrespective of the screen we set. Second, in our regressions, 
we control for the fraction of weeks with zero returns, so that liquidity is allowed to explain the risk 
measures. While there is a strong negative relation between systematic risk and the fraction of weeks 
without trading, the relation between idiosyncratic risk and the fraction of weeks without trading is 
relatively small. We conclude that our results are not caused by differences in liquidity across countries. 
Following Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), the literature has paid considerable attention to R2 as a way 
to assess the importance of idiosyncratic risk. Accordingly, we also show results for R2. We find limited 
evidence of a consistent relation between R2 and country characteristics. However, R2 increases sharply 
with the anti-director index and decreases with disclosure. Since we find that idiosyncratic risk increases 
with the anti-director index and that idiosyncratic risk falls with disclosure, our results show that one 
should be extremely cautious in interpreting results from R2 regressions on country characteristics. R2 
depends on systematic risk as well as idiosyncratic risk. In our regressions, R2 increases with the anti-
director index even though idiosyncratic risk also increases with that index because systematic risk 
increases with the anti-director index to a greater extent than does idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, R2 
decreases with disclosure because systematic risk is more strongly negatively related to disclosure than 
idiosyncratic risk is. There is no consistent relation between stock market development and R2. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we describe our data and our matching procedure. In 
Section II, we show that foreign firms have less idiosyncratic risk than comparable U.S. firms, that this 
risk difference holds after adjusting for leverage, and that it is not simply the product of differences in 
liquidity. In Section III, we investigate why foreign firms have systematically lower idiosyncratic risk 
than U.S. firms. In Section IV, we compare R2 at the firm level. We conclude in Section V. 
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I. Data	
We construct our sample by collecting annual accounting data in U.S. dollars on all firms in the 
Worldscope database from 1990 through 2006. We require that lagged firm age, lagged market-to-book, 
and lagged book value of assets not be missing as we subsequently use these variables to match foreign 
firms to comparable U.S. firms. As we discuss in detail later, the Worldscope database includes only a 
subset of firms in each country, mostly larger ones. We drop firms that are missing data on total assets, 
market price at year-end, book value per share, shares outstanding, book value of long-term debt, and 
book value of short-term debt. We consider a firm’s country to be the country of its primary listing; we 
exclude all secondary listings.7 Further, we exclude non-primary issues, U.S. OTC Bulletin Board and 
“Pink Sheet” stocks, firms with missing country or firm identifiers, as well as real estate and other 
investment trusts. 
We match the remaining firms to stock return data from Datastream.8 To enter the sample, firms must 
have available returns data for at least 25 weeks in the observation year. We exclude country-years in 
which fewer than 10 firms have available data. This screen excludes Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zimbabwe 
from the entire sample. To address concerns about data errors in Datastream, we also implement a 
commonly used filter for reversals in the data that could be caused by incorrect stock prices, and we 
winsorize the top and bottom 0.1% of the final sample of stock returns.9 
The resulting primary data set contains 197,299 firm-year observations representing 50 countries. Not 
surprisingly, the number of firms available increases steadily throughout the 1990s. For instance, while 
we have roughly 4,000 firms in 1991, the number of firms increases to approximately 22,000 towards the 
                                                 
7 With this approach, a firm with a primary listing in London that has an American Depository Receipt (ADR) 
program is included in the sample as a U.K. firm and the ADR is ignored. 
8 We match firms based on common identifiers (Datastream code, Datastream Mnemonic, Sedols, Cusips, ISIN, 
etc.) as best available. We impose a number of filters because firms can have multiple share classes or listing 
locations.  For example, we screen on the security type, use only primary listings, and require that the currency of 
the stock price be a legal tender in the firm’s country of incorporation.  We also manually verify matches in many 
cases, because firms can have multiple share classes or listing locations.  Leading and trailing zeros in the return 
series are set to missing values. 
9 In particular, we set Rt and Rt-1 to missing if |Rt| > 200% or |Rt-1| > 200% and Rt-1 + Rt < 50%. See Ince and Porter 
(2006) for a discussion of data errors in Datastream and possible solutions. 
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end of our sample period.10 Not all countries are present each year. In particular, representation from 
developing economies is concentrated in the latter half of the sample. Panel A of Table I provides the list 
of countries for which we have observations and for each country gives the number of firm-years for that 
country. The U.S. has the largest number of firm-years, with roughly 55,000 firm-years. In contrast, 
several countries, such as the Czech Republic and Venezuela, have less than 200 firm-years. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
We calculate three primary measures of firm volatility each year using weekly (Friday-to-Friday) 
USD closing prices to calculate returns (though our primary results are essentially unchanged if we 
conduct all of our analysis using local currency returns). The first risk measure is simply the annualized 
standard deviation of weekly stock returns. Our other two risk measures are obtained by decomposing 
total risk into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. Such decomposition requires a model of systematic 
risk. One approach is to use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In an international setting, however, 
the CAPM can hold locally or globally.11 It holds locally if the local market is segmented from the rest of 
the world, and globally if it is fully integrated. Rather than choosing a local or global CAPM a priori, a 
possible model for returns is one in which returns depend on both the local market portfolio and the world 
market portfolio. We choose this approach. It is well known that the CAPM does not capture all priced 
risks. The Fama-French SML and HML factors are widely used as determinants of expected returns. 
However, in an international setting, a problem with the use of these factors is that in many countries 
there are too few securities to construct meaningful local SML and HML portfolios. Following Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Zhang (2010), we construct these factors regionally. Therefore, our model for returns 
regresses dollar returns each year on the world market portfolio, the local market portfolio, and the global 
and regional SMB and HML factors. 
                                                 
10 There are two primary reasons for this trend.  First, the total number of listings on Worldscope of all types 
increases from about 20,380 in 1991 to 35,322 in 2006.  Second, the data availability (and liquidity) screens 
eliminate a significantly higher percentage of firms in early years than in later years.  The proportion of U.S. versus 
non-U.S. firms affected by these screens is roughly constant over the sample period. 
11 See Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a review of the international asset pricing literature. 
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Specifically, for each firm-year with sufficient data, we estimate 
 Rt =  + Lt-1RLt-1 + LtRLt + Lt+1RLt+1 + WRWt  
        + RHMLRRHMLt + WHMLRWHMLt  + RSMBRRSMBt + WSMBRWSMBt + t      (1) 
where Rt is the firm’s stock return in week t, RLt is the return on the local market index, RWt is the return 
on the world market index, RRHMLt is the return on the regional HML portfolio, RWHMLt is the return on 
the world HML portfolio, RRSMBt is the return on the regional SMB portfolio, RWSMBt is the return on the 
world SMB portfolio, and εt is an error term. Our estimate of idiosyncratic volatility is the (annualized) 
standard deviation of εt, . Our estimate of systematic risk is the square root of the difference between 
total return variance and . We also examine the R2 statistic from the regressions. 
Panel A of Table I shows the median estimates of our risk measures for each country as well as the 
median R2. The last row of the table gives the median of the country medians (which we call the sample 
country median for simplicity), which is 39.1% for total risk. There is a wide range of country medians 
for total risk. Emerging markets are at each end of the spectrum, as Morocco has a median of 25.0% and 
Venezuela has a median of 55.9%. Only 11 countries have a higher median for total risk than the U.S. 
These 11 countries include emerging countries, but also Australia and Canada. While 28 countries have 
higher systematic risk than the U.S., only seven countries have higher idiosyncratic risk. This finding 
shows that idiosyncratic risk is high in the U.S. compared to the rest of the world even if we simply 
compare country medians. Finally, only one country has a lower median R2 than the U.S. Surprisingly, 
that country is China.12 However, comparisons of country medians do not adjust for differences in firms 
and industries across countries. Hence, these comparisons do not tell us how risk measures differ across 
countries for similar firms. 
                                                 
12 It is paradoxical that China would have a lower R2 than the U.S. since China motivated the Morck, Yeung, and Yu 
(2000) study, as one of the authors observed the surprisingly high synchronicity of Chinese stocks when visiting 
China. However, the bulk of our data for China comes from the years in our sample that are not present in the 
sample of the Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) study. Note that our sampling procedure excludes firms with less than 
one year of data, so that firms immediately after their IPO are not included in the sample and hence the result cannot 
be explained by firms in their first year after their IPO.   
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We collect data on a variety of firm characteristics from the Worldscope database. These include the 
firm’s market-to-book ratio, its total assets, plant, property and equipment (PPE), research and 
development expenses (R&D), capital expenditures (CapEx), gross profit margin, and cash and short-term 
investments. We calculate ratios for most of these variables to make them comparable across companies. 
For R&D, we set missing values to zero. We measure firm age as the number of years between the listing 
date (or first date on Datastream) and the observation year plus one (so that we can take the natural 
logarithm). Accounting data are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% and for values more than five 
standard deviations from the median. Since we winsorize returns only at the 0.1% level, we replicate all 
our tables with returns winsorized at the 1%. Even though winsorizing returns at this level seems 
problematic in that it could bias the dependent variable downwards, we find that our conclusions are not 
affected. We reproduce these results in the Internet Appendix. Finally, we apply some limits to a few 
variables.13 Variable definitions are summarized in the Appendix. 
Panel A of Table I provides country medians for sample firm characteristics. Median age varies 
widely across countries. The median age of U.S. firms is two years higher than the sample country 
median. The median market-to-book for the U.S. is at the upper end of the country medians. Only two 
countries, China and the U.K., have higher medians. The lowest country median is Venezuela. 
The use of the frequency of non-trading as a measure of market liquidity is well-established in the 
literature (see, for instance, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) and Lesmond (2005)).14  Since we 
have weekly returns, we use the fraction of weekly zero local currency returns to measure the extent of 
non-trading. Table I shows the median percentage of non-trading weeks for stocks in our sample for each 
country. As expected from the literature, non-trading varies substantially across countries. The U.S. 
percentage is below the country median. However, the median percentage of zero returns may appear 
surprisingly low in countries where one would not expect it to be low, like Peru. The explanation is that 
                                                 
13 Specifically, we limit gross profit margin to be greater than or equal to -100% and set market-to-book to 20 when 
it is greater than 20 or when book value is less than or equal to zero. 
14 Trading volume data at the firm level cannot be used because reliable trading volume data at the firm level are not 
available for a large percentage of our firm-years.  This is a well-known shortcoming of the international returns 
data available from Datastream. 
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our sample of firms in a country is neither a random sample nor a complete sample of the firms listed in a 
country. 
Leverage tends to vary widely across countries. The U.S. median leverage is lower than the sample 
country median and most emerging markets have a higher median leverage than the U.S. The profitability 
of U.S. firms is at the upper end of the range across countries. The median cash holdings of U.S. firms of 
9.4% is 1.1% higher than the median across countries. Lastly, U.S. firms have more long-term debt 
relative to short-term debt than firms in any country except New Zealand. We also use R&D expenditures 
to total assets as well as the R&D share in a firm’s investment (R&D divided by the sum of R&D and 
capital expenditures). Since the medians of R&D and of the R&D share are essentially zero for each 
foreign country, we do not tabulate the results. These data show that there is wide variation in firm 
characteristics across countries in our sample. As a result, the risk measures could differ across countries 
simply because firms have different characteristics. 
We now turn to the country variables (the Appendix gives detailed definitions and sources for all 
these variables). We measure the quality of political and legal institutions using the ICRG Political Risk 
index. This index measures the overall stability and quality of government institutions using 10 different 
qualitative measures. Higher values represent more stable and higher quality government institutions. 
This index is highly correlated with other common measures of political and legal quality such as the 
Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) rule of law index (correlation equals 0.896). We use the ICRG 
political risk index because it measures a variety of institutional characteristics and data are available for 
every year and country in our sample. 
As a proxy for shareholder protection and corporate governance we use the anti-director rights index 
from DLLS.15 Higher values are associated with better shareholder protection and governance. Spamann 
(2010) produces an anti-director index that differs from the DLLS index, but it is not available for several 
of the countries in our sample. We also use the index of creditor rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and 
                                                 
15  We use the revised version discussed in DLLS (2008) and available on the website of Andrei Shleifer: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. We thank the authors for making these data available. 
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Shleifer (2007); higher values represent better creditor rights. 
We employ two proxies for equity market development that are frequently used in the literature. The 
first measure is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. The second measure is the stock market 
turnover rate, which is total stock market volume as a percent of total shares outstanding. Though the 
latter measure is often used as a measure of equity market development, it is noteworthy that some of the 
highest values in our sample are from less economically developed countries. Our proxy for credit market 
development is the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP. We also use alternative measures 
of credit market development, and the results are consistent with those we present here. 
We employ two variables that measure a country’s financial openness. The first is a measure of 
capital account openness calculated by Ito and Chinn (2008) that is based on several measures of 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. Higher values of the capital account openness measure 
indicate fewer restrictions on cross-border financial flows. The second measure assesses equity market 
liberalization as in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) by estimating the percentage of equity market 
value that is investable by foreign investors. 
To measure the degree of innovation, we use the number of U.S. patents per person in each sample 
country each year.  Previous research (e.g., Furman, Porter, and Stern (2001)) demonstrates that this 
measure provides explanatory power for national innovative capacity and the commercial viability of 
research and development investment.  Finally, prior research documents that firm growth options and 
firm risk are positively related (e.g., Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2008)).  Therefore, wealso examine the 
measure of country (global) growth options derived by Bekaert, et al (2007), which uses global price-to-
earnings ratios applied to a given country’s industry mix.16  Unfortunately, this measure is not available 
for some of our sample countries. Consequently, we do not use it in our main analysis. 
Panel B of Table I shows the median country characteristics for our sample. Not surprisingly, there is 
a wide range of GDP per capita values, and the U.S. is at the upper end of that range. The U.S. has less 
                                                 
16 We thank the authors for making these data available. 
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political risk than the median country, but many countries have even less political risk than the U.S. 
Finland has the least political risk, and most developed countries have lower political risk than the U.S. 
While the U.S. has low creditor rights, it has the highest disclosure index. The U.S. has an anti-director 
rights index close to the median. The level of U.S. stock market development is high compared to other 
countries. However, showing the limitations of the turnover measure, some developing countries have 
higher turnover and market capitalization to GDP ratios than the U.S. Only one country (Denmark) has a 
higher ratio of bond market capitalization to GDP than the U.S. The U.S. is at the upper end of the 
openness measures. There is wide variation in the innovation measure (patents) across countries. 
We require firms to be on Worldscope and to meet various sampling requirements. Panel B of Table I 
shows, for each country, the percentage of all listed firms that are in our sample (market coverage). This 
percentage varies widely. While it is 67% for U.S. firms, it is only 12% for Peru.17 As a result, in some 
countries our sample includes only the most liquid firms. While we do not use it in our analysis, we also 
report for reference the volatility of the value-weighted Datastream market index. 
The properties of the risk measures we use depend on the liquidity of stocks. Since the liquidity of 
stocks varies across firms in the sample, we report only results using sample firm-year observations for 
which the firm has less than 30% zero returns in the previous year (e.g., nonzero stock returns for at least 
36 weeks if return data are available for all weeks in a year). This reduces the number of firms in our 
analysis by about 5% and the number of firm-years in our sample by about 20%.18 We subsequently 
examine different cutoffs to see the effect on our results, but unless we indicate otherwise, our analysis is 
conducted using that cutoff. Further, in our regressions we control directly for the extent of non-trading as 
well as for the extent of stock market coverage. 
                                                 
17 The percentage is substantially lower than 100% for the U.S. because of our exclusion of OTC Bulletin Board and 
Pink Sheet listings (that can appear in the Datastream and Worldscope database) as well as secondary listings and 
investment trusts. 
18 In most cases we lose some, but not all, years for a given firm because of too many nonzero return observations, 
thus the percentage of firms lost is much less than the percent of firm-years lost. 
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II. Differences	in	Volatility	Measures	for	Matched	Firms	
A comparison of the median or average risk measures across countries is a comparison of risk 
measures of different firms. In this paper, we want to compare similar firms across countries. In the first 
part of this section we describe our matching procedure and the matched sample. In the second part of the 
section we examine differences in volatility measures for the matched firms. 
 
A. The Matching Procedure 
To analyze comparable firms, we have to choose a metric that can be used to capture similarity. One 
approach often used in the literature is to compare firms along a single dimension, such as size or market-
to-book, perhaps within an industry. An alternative approach that has become increasingly popular in 
recent years is to compare firms using an econometric model called propensity score matching. The 
benefit of this approach is that it makes it possible to compare firms along multiple dimensions in a 
quantifiable way. The results presented in our tables use this econometric approach. Specifically, we 
match to each foreign firm a similar U.S. firm.  To identify matching U.S. firms we employ propensity 
score (p-score) matching using several characteristics.19  In essence, the p-score provides a method for 
identifying a matching U.S. firm based on factors that we believe are inherent characteristics determining 
risk. The method involves two steps.  First a logit regression is estimated with the independent variable 
equal to one if the firm is a U.S. firm and zero otherwise. Independent variables include any 
characteristics we wish to control for across firms. Predicted values from the estimation are used to match 
a U.S. firm whose chosen characteristics are statistically most similar to each non-U.S. firm. 
In this comparison, we want to avoid using firm characteristics that may be determined at the same 
time as the risk measures, since if we were to do so there would be a concern that our risk measures and 
firm characteristics were simultaneously determined. We mitigate this problem in two ways. First, we use 
only lagged firm characteristics to match firms, so that we match firms on predetermined variables. 
                                                 
19 For earlier uses of this approach in finance, see Lee and Wahal (2004), Drucker and Puri (2005), and Bartram, 
Brown, and Conrad (2011), among others. 
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Second, we match on variables that are likely to be exogenous firm characteristics. Specifically, we match 
U.S. firms (with replacement) to non-U.S. firms based on firm size (log of total assets measured in USD), 
the log of firm age, and the equity market-to-book ratio. We perform the matching each year, as firm 
characteristics change over time, and by industry, one year prior to the observation year.20 As explained 
earlier, we restrict the sample in our primary analysis to firms that have less than 30% of non-trading 
weeks. 
In determining a matching scheme based on propensity scores, we find matching U.S. firms with 
replacement since the sample of foreign firms is much larger. We also pick just one matching U.S. firm 
for each non-U.S. firm based on the “nearest neighbor” method.21 Research in the statistical literature 
identifies potential shortcomings of the propensity score matching technique such as low power in small 
samples, a need for group overlap across characteristics of interest, and omitted variable bias. These 
concerns are mitigated by our large sample with substantial overlap across matching characteristics. 
While it is always possible that our documented differences in risk are affected by important omitted 
variables, our analysis is focused on identifying the firm and country characteristics that explain these 
differences. Consequently, we do not seek to include all possible determinants of firm risk in our 
matching process and instead analyze other factors in our subsequent regression analysis. Overall, the 
quality of our matches is very high. For all matches, the average and median differences in p-score are 
essentially zero (<0.001) with a standard deviation of 0.0068. The 5% to 95% range is -0.0034 to 0.0040. 
Table II compares firm and country characteristics for the matched firms in our sample. In this table 
each observation is the average of available years for a foreign firm and its matching U.S. firm(s). 
Matching U.S. firms tend to be significantly larger and older. Since firm size and age are negatively 
associated with risk, this imperfect matching could lead to a bias toward finding that foreign firms are 
                                                 
20 Industries are defined using the updated 17 industry portfolio classification system available on Ken French’s web 
site.  We thank Ken French for making these data available. 
21 Other options include using multiple U.S. firms for each foreign firm and using a caliper matching criterion 
whereby all characteristics of matching U.S. firms must be sufficiently close to those of the non-U.S. firm.  
Experiments with alternative matching methods suggest that these choices do not substantially affect our results, so 
we employ a fairly simple version of the propensity score matching method. 
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riskier. To mitigate the impact of imperfect matching, we also control for these characteristics in our 
regression analysis. As noted above, differences in p-scores are negligible and not statistically significant. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
We now turn to firm characteristics that are not used in the matching procedure. Differences in 
leverage are not economically significant. Evaluated at the means, the leverage of foreign firms is higher 
than the leverage of similar U.S. firms by only half of a percentage point. Foreign firms have a greater 
ratio of plant, property, and equipment to total assets than U.S. firms. Further, they invest roughly the 
same in capital expenditures but less in R&D than U.S. firms. The difference in R&D investment is 
economically large, as the average R&D investment rate of U.S. firms is almost three times higher than 
that of foreign firms. The median R&D share for foreign firms is zero, while it is 8.5% for matched U.S. 
firms. We see that foreign firms are also less profitable, hold less cash, and have debt of shorter maturity. 
For foreign firms, about 8.9% of returns are zero, which is almost twice the percentage of U.S. firms. This 
difference in the percentage of zero returns raises the concern that infrequent trading could play more of a 
role for foreign firms than for U.S. firms, which might lead to downward-biased measures of risk for 
foreign firms even though we impose the 30% threshold for non-trading weeks. It is well known that a 
determinant of illiquidity, the bid-ask spread, biases estimates of systematic risk downward and estimates 
of idiosyncratic risk upwards (see, for example, Han and Lesmond (2010)). Greater illiquidity of foreign 
stocks would therefore seem to bias our results towards finding less idiosyncratic risk in U.S. stocks than 
foreign stocks. However, in our subsequent analyses we address this issue in a number of ways to show 
that differences in illiquidity across countries do not explain our results. 
Table II also compares country characteristics between foreign firms and matching U.S. firms. We 
compare averages and medians for foreign firms and their matched U.S. firms. On average, foreign firms 
have more political risk, better creditor rights protection, a lower anti-director rights index, worse 
disclosure, less open capital markets, less innovation, lower growth opportunities, and a less volatile stock 
market index. The results for medians are similar. 
 
 18
B. Comparing Risk Measures for Matched Firms 
Panel A of Table III reports mean and median values for our volatility measures for foreign firms and 
their matching U.S. firms. The reported values are for firm averages, so that each foreign firm appears 
only once. Risk measures are calculated as the square root of average variances. U.S. firms have 
significantly higher total volatility (return standard deviation) than their matching foreign firms. The 
mean difference in total risk of -0.143 translates into the median U.S. firm having total risk that is 25.7% 
higher than its foreign counterpart. Foreign firms have higher systematic risk on average than U.S. firms, 
but the percentage difference is much smaller than for idiosyncratic risk, as it is only 9.0%. Foreign firms 
have lower idiosyncratic risk than U.S. firms, and the mean idiosyncratic volatility of U.S. firms is 32.1% 
higher than the mean idiosyncratic volatility of their matching foreign firms. The difference in systematic 
risk equates to only about 20% of the difference in total risk; consequently, almost all of the difference in 
total risk is attributable to the difference in idiosyncratic risk. To understand why U.S. stocks are more 
volatile, we therefore have to understand why they have more idiosyncratic risk. Thus, in the following 
we mostly focus on idiosyncratic risk. Finally, the results for R2 show that average R2 is higher for foreign 
firms than for U.S. firms by 17.4%. All differences are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
In the remainder of Panel A, we split the sample between firms in developed countries and firms in 
emerging markets. 22  We define a country as an emerging market if the country does not have a 
completely liberalized equity market using the measure of Edison and Warnock (2003). Firms from 
developed markets as well as firms from emerging markets have lower total risk than matching U.S. firms.  
In fact, levels of total risk are fairly similar for emerging and developed economies. It is important to note, 
however, that the U.S. firms matched to emerging market firms have lower total volatility than the U.S. 
firms matched to developed market firms, reflecting the fact that the characteristics of emerging market 
                                                 
22 Firms in countries that change classifications (e.g., from developing to developed) during our sample period will 
appear in both classifications, but we calculate firm averages using separate periods so that no firm-years are used 
twice.  This explains why the sum of observations for developed and developing countries is slightly more than for 
all countries. 
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firms differ from those of developed market firms. When we turn to systematic risk, developed market 
firms have lower systematic risk than U.S. firms, but emerging market firms have about the same 
systematic risk as matching U.S. firms. Idiosyncratic risk is lower for both developed market firms and 
emerging market firms compared to matching U.S. firms. Finally, the R2 of developed and emerging 
market firms is higher than for their matching U.S. firms. These results confirm the findings of Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu (2000) when the R2 comparison is made using comparable firms. 
We see in the previous section that foreign firms seem to trade less than U.S. firms. This result raises 
the concern that U.S. firms might have higher risk measures not because they are riskier but simply 
because their risk is measured more accurately because they are more liquid. To evaluate whether 
infrequent trading can explain our results, we show in Panel B of Table III estimates of risk measures for 
firms with less than 10% zero returns, less than 30% zero returns, and no restriction on zero returns. 
Restrictions on zero returns affect the estimates of the risk measures. A stricter threshold for non-trading 
pulls the absolute value of the differences towards zero. When we limit our comparison to firms with less 
than 10% zero returns, the mean and median differences in systematic risk between foreign firms and 
matching U.S. firms are very small. However, for all our other comparisons, the mean and median 
differences are large, significant, and of same sign across the different thresholds. It is important to note 
that the economic significance of the difference in idiosyncratic risk between foreign firms and matching 
U.S. firms is still substantial when we impose the strictest threshold for non-trading. As we point out 
earlier, for the 30% threshold, the idiosyncratic risk of matching U.S. firms is 32.1% higher than the 
idiosyncratic risk of foreign firms. When we use the 10% threshold, the difference is 23.4%. Though most 
of our analysis focuses on the sample in which we use the 30% threshold, we also discuss results using 
the other thresholds. 
In Figure 1, we show how the risk measures evolve over the sample period. Panel A shows the 
evolution of total risk. Total risk for U.S. firms has an inverted U-shape, peaking in 2002. The mean for 
foreign firms increases in the late 1990s as well, but does not keep increasing with the U.S. mean after 
1998. The U.S. mean is higher than the foreign mean for almost all years in the sample. The patterns for 
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systematic risk show that foreign firms have a spike in systematic risk in 1998, while the systematic risk 
of U.S. firms has an inverted U-shape similar to that observed for total risk. Panel C shows the means for 
idiosyncratic risk. The dynamics for idiosyncratic risk are similar to those for total risk, which is not 
surprising in light of the literature for the U.S. (see Campbell et al.(2001)).  Guo and Savickas (2011) and 
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2010) examine the time-series pattern of volatility across countries and also 
find them to be elevated in 2001 and 2002. Finally, we see in Panel D that the difference in average R2 
seems to be much smaller in the second half of the sample period.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table IV shows the mean differences between the risk characteristics of foreign firms and the risk 
characteristics of U.S. firms by year. There are four years in which the total risk of foreign firms is 
actually significantly higher than the total risk of matching U.S. firms. However, both for the 1990s and 
for the 2000s, the average total risk of foreign firms is significantly lower than the total risk of their 
matching U.S. firms. The largest differences in total risk are in the early 2000s. Foreign firms actually 
have higher systematic risk than matching U.S. firms in the 1990s, but the opposite result holds in the 
2000s. While the differences in total and systematic risk between foreign firms and U.S. matching firms 
fluctuate, foreign firms have significantly lower idiosyncratic risk than their matching U.S. firms every 
year except one. In 1997, which included the Asian financial crisis, the difference is not significantly 
different from zero. Finally, R2 is significantly lower for U.S. firms in all years. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
This section demonstrates that foreign firms consistently have lower idiosyncratic volatility than 
comparable U.S. firms. Further, the greater idiosyncratic volatility of foreign firms cannot be explained 
by differences in liquidity. 
III. Why	Do	Foreign	Firms	Have	Lower	Idiosyncratic	Volatility?	
In this section, we investigate the determinants of the difference in risk measures between foreign 
and U.S. firms. In Section IV, we separately consider the determinants of R2. Our primary focus in this 
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section is the difference in idiosyncratic volatility. We first present our main results and then discuss a 
battery of robustness tests. We conclude with a brief examination of the determinants of systematic risk. 
 
A. The Determinants of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
In the regressions, we regress differences in risk measures between foreign firms and their matching 
U.S. firms on differences in country and firm characteristics. It is legitimate to be concerned that when the 
left-hand- and right-hand-side variables of these regressions are contemporaneous, these variables could 
be jointly determined, perhaps as a function of some omitted variables. This problem is mitigated by 
regressing a volatility measure at time t on firm and country characteristics at time t-1. A second 
important concern is that many country characteristics change little over time, and that the risk measures 
themselves are autocorrelated. A third important concern is that many country characteristics are highly 
correlated, so that a country characteristic could be related to a risk measure not because it affects the risk 
measure by itself, but because it is correlated with another country characteristic that affects that risk 
measure. Finally, the composition of the sample changes over time, and there are many more firms in the 
later years of the sample. 
To address these concerns, we use four different approaches and include some control variables. Our 
main approach is to use Fama-MacBeth style regressions that include country and firm characteristics as 
explanatory variables.  With these regressions, the fact that the number of firms is much larger towards 
the end of our sample period does not influence our results. We correct the standard errors with the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure to account for autocorrelation. The second approach is to estimate the 
Fama-McBeth style regressions using one characteristic at a time. This approach helps us better 
understand the extent to which multicollinearity among our country-level variables may affect our 
inferences. The third approach we use eliminates the serial correlation problem altogether, but at the cost 
of no longer making use of the changes in country and firm characteristics over time. With this third 
approach, we estimate a single cross-sectional regression where each firm enters the sample only once. 
For each firm, we calculate mean values of variables using the firm-years with data available for the 
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dependent variable. The final approach uses panel regressions where we account for autocorrelation using 
the Yule-Walker method. This method has been recently used in research investigating the determinants 
of idiosyncratic volatility (Irvine and Pontiff (2009)). It is advantageous in our setting since we have a 
short timeseries and the method allows us to retain the first observations for each firm (unlike some 
alternative methods). It is comforting that our results are generally robust to the choice of estimation 
method in that, in general, the four approaches we use do not lead to inconsistent results, that is, 
significant coefficient estimates for a variable that have opposite signs.  
The dependent variable in our regressions is the log difference in volatility measures between foreign 
firms and matching U.S. firms. We standardize the explanatory variables to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one (we standardize by year for Fama-MacBeth regressions.). The standardization 
allows us to interpret estimated coefficients for variables as the effect on volatility of a one standard 
deviation change in the variables under consideration.  In addition to our hypothesized explanatory 
variables, we include the matching variables to account for possible bias from imperfect matching, the 
percent of zero weekly returns as a control for differences in liquidity, and each country’s percentage of 
all listed companies that are represented in our sample each year (labeled as “Market Coverage”) to 
control for a possible selection bias in the Worldscope and Datastream databases. 
Table V shows the estimates for our regressions.23 We first discuss the coefficients for the country 
characteristics. As discussed in the introduction, the theoretical predictions for the relation between 
political risk and idiosyncratic volatility are ambiguous. With the Fama-MacBeth regression that includes 
all the variables, political risk is not significant. It has a negative significant coefficient with two other 
regressions and a positive significant coefficient with another. Consequently, we do not find conclusive 
support for the view that firms in countries with less political risk have more idiosyncratic risk. 
                                                 
23 Sample sizes across the specifications vary because of differences in estimation method.  In the first two columns 
we report the average number of observations for the cross-sectional regressions in the Fama-MacBeth regressions.  
(Similarly, for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, we report as R-squared the average R2 of the cross-sectional 
regressions.) The actual number of observations used in these estimations is 93,184.  The single cross-section 
sample size of 15,293 represents the number of unique firms in our sample.  The results for the Yule-Walker panel 
regressions use all available firm-year observations.     
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[Insert Table V about here] 
We turn next to the two investor protection variables, the creditor rights index and the anti-director 
index. The relation between idiosyncratic risk and creditor rights is insignificant in all the regressions 
with multiple country variables. The relation between idiosyncratic risk and the anti-director index is 
significant and positive in all but the single cross-sectional regression. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions from the literature. When we use the Spamann (2010) version of the anti-director 
index, we have fewer countries, but the coefficient is positive as well and very similar in magnitude. We 
find that idiosyncratic volatility is increasing in stock market development but decreasing in bond market 
development. Capital account openness is strongly negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility. We use a 
separate measure of equity market liberalization. This measure is highly correlated with GDP per capita, 
so that we use the residual of a regression of that measure on GDP per capita. We find no consistent 
evidence of a positive relation between equity market liberalization and idiosyncratic volatility. Our 
country-level measure of innovativeness is patents per capita. This measure is also strongly correlated 
with GDP per capita, so we orthogonalize it as well. More innovative countries have firms with higher 
idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, disclosure tends to be negatively related to idiosyncratic risk. Because of 
our normalization, the absolute value of the coefficients in our regressions is a measure of the economic 
significance of a variable. In the Fama-MacBeth multiple regression, the statistically significant country 
variables that are the most economically significant are, in order of economic significance, disclosure, 
patents, and capital account openness. 
Whereas it is reasonable to assume that country characteristics are exogenous with respect to future 
firm idiosyncratic volatility, such an assumption is not as reasonable for firm characteristics. Care should 
be taken, therefore, in interpreting the regression coefficients on firm characteristics. However, though we 
do not show the results, it is comforting that the coefficients on the country variables remain essentially 
the same if we do not include firm characteristics. The negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility 
and total assets, age, and profitability that has been documented for U.S. firms (see Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003)) holds in our sample. We further find that idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related to the ratio 
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of plant, property, and equipment to total assets and debt maturity. Idiosyncratic volatility increases with 
R&D, leverage, and cash holdings. One would not expect higher cash holdings to cause greater 
idiosyncratic risk; rather, firms that have characteristics that make them riskier hold more cash. 
Consequently, possible explanations for the cash result are that cash holdings proxy for firm risk 
characteristics that are not controlled for in the regression, and that firms that expect greater future 
idiosyncratic risk hold more cash. Though market-to-book sometimes has a positive significant 
coefficient, it is quite small. This may be because our matching procedure works well for that variable. 
The percent zero returns is significant but has a relatively small negative coefficient. The selection 
variable, market coverage, is insignificant in two regressions and is negative and significant, but small in 
absolute value, in the other regressions.  
For both country variables and firm-level variables, idiosyncratic risk increases with innovativeness. 
Idiosyncratic volatility increases with R&D share as predicted. The coefficient on R&D share is as 
economically significant as any country variable, and age is much more so. To better understand the 
importance of R&D share, it is useful to note that an increase in the difference in the R&D share between 
the U.S. firm and the foreign firm corresponds to an increase in the difference in idiosyncratic volatility of 
0.045, or about 30% of the difference between the U.S. firm and the foreign firm. 
Table V shows that idiosyncratic risk is related to country characteristics as well as firm 
characteristics. Idiosyncratic volatility increases with equity market development and innovation; it falls 
with bond market development and capital account openness. A country’s equity market development and 
innovation could reflect that country’s growth opportunities. In regression (1) of Table VI, we therefore 
estimate the regression in the first column of Table V but add country-level growth opportunities.24  We 
                                                 
24  We have repeated the robustness checks with our other regression methods, but the Fama-MacBeth style 
regressions with multiple country variables tend to have the weakest results, so we report these to be conservative. 
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find that this variable is not significant, and adding it to the regression does not meaningfully affect other 
results.25 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) find that a cross-listing in the U.S. increases idiosyncratic volatility for 
firms from developed countries, but not from emerging markets. In regression (2) of Table VI, we allow 
country characteristics to have a different impact on idiosyncratic volatility for firms with a U.S. cross-
listing. We would expect country variables to be less economically relevant for firms that have an ADR 
program as these firms are in effect “renting” U.S. institutions. We find some evidence in support of this 
hypothesis for the private bond market and patents. When we estimate the regressions with one country 
variable at a time, we also find that the impacts of turnover and disclosure are attenuated for ADR firms 
(not reported).  However, we find that firms with cross-listings from countries with higher stock and bond 
market capitalization have higher idiosyncratic volatility, which is consistent with the results of Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008). 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
As we saw in Table I, the extent of infrequent trading differs across countries. We therefore 
investigate whether these differences affect our results. Specification (3) in Table VI shows the regression 
estimated imposing a 10% threshold for zero returns. The results are fairly similar though the coefficients 
on stock market turnover and market capitalization become slightly larger, and both are significant at the 
5% level. However, the significance of the private bond market variable slips to a p-value of 0.33.  
Regression (4) imposes no threshold. In this case, the results are even more similar to those presented in 
Table V. 
To investigate the robustness of our results, we perform two more experiments. First, the analysis so 
far uses a sample that includes financial firms. Regression (5) excludes financial firms. The key results 
are the same. Second, throughout our analysis we have matched foreign firms to U.S. firms using industry, 
                                                 
25 This result is not too surprising since we have other country and firm variables that measure growth opportunities 
(patents, R&D share, and the market-to-book ratio), our risk model includes local and world HML factors, and we 
match on market-to-book. 
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market-to-book, size, and age. In Regression (6) we consider a simpler matching procedure by matching 
only on industry and size. Doing so has no significant impact on our results (though the average adjusted 
R2 is much lower). It is noteworthy that in that regression market-to-book has a significant positive 
coefficient, suggesting that the insignificant coefficient in regression (1) of Table V is explained by the 
fact that we use market-to-book in our matching procedure for that regression. 
We also conduct a large number of other robustness checks for which we do not tabulate results here. 
For example, given that many of the country variables are correlated we try a variety of different 
combinations of country variables and are confident that our reported results provide a good 
characterization of the results of alternative specifications. Of particular concern is the fact that many of 
the country variables are significantly related to overall levels of economic development (GDP per capita). 
Simply including GDP per capita in the regressions is somewhat problematic for this reason. However, 
when we do this, we find that the coefficients on stock market turnover and stock market capitalization 
are larger and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on the index of political risk becomes 
negative and significant at the 1% level (remember that the political risk index is higher for countries with 
less politicial risk). This is despite the fact that GDP per capita itself is not usually significant in these 
regressions. Other robustness checks include estimating regressions at the country level (with and without 
averages of firm-level variables), different weighting schemes for the estimation to account for changes in 
sample size, and alternative methods to account for endogenous variables and autocorrelated errors in the 
panel regression estimations. We also use various measures of leverage to calculate “unlevered” risk 
measures and find that the results still hold.  This validation suggests that the results are driven by 
differences in fundamental business or asset risk versus differences simply in financial policies. We also 
estimate regressions for the 1997-2006 period only to make sure the results are not affected by the 
relatively small sample in earlier years. Such an approach lacks power for Fama-MacBeth regressions 
since we have only nine cross-sections. Nevertheless, we find the results to be largely consistent with the 
full-sample results, and we find the Yule-Walker results to be completely consistent except that the 
creditor rights variable acquires a positive significant coefficient. Finally, we separately estimate 
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regressions using a world market model and a domestic market model. The results of these regressions are 
generally consistent with the results we report. Overall, we are confident that the tabulated results are 
robust and provide a conservative summary of a variety of alternative methods. Details of some of these 
tests are available in the Internet Appendix. 
 
B. The Determinants of Systematic Risk 
We now briefly discuss the determinants of systematic risk (the results for total risk, reproduced in 
the Internet Appendix, are typically similar to those for idiosyncratic risk). The results of our regression 
analysis are presented in Table VII and follow the same format as for idiosyncratic risk. Several of the 
relations between our explanatory variables and systematic risk are the same as those observed for 
idiosyncratic risk. This is not unexpected since previous research has documented similar time-series and 
cross-country patterns in risk measures (e.g., Campbell et al. (2001) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang 
(2010)). Nonetheless, there are important differences. 
[Insert Table VII about here] 
In the introduction, we point out that countries with more political risk are expected to have more 
systematic risk, while the relation for idiosyncratic risk is ambiguous. Consistent with this, we find that 
systematic risk tends to increase with political risk (the coefficient is negative because the political risk 
index increases as political risk decreases). The economic significance of political risk can be large.  For 
example, in the regressions that use one country variable at a time, the only variable that has greater 
economic significance is leverage. Garmaise and Liu (2005) develop a model in which corruption leads to 
an increase in systematic risk because managers expropriate more in bad states of the world. They find 
that betas increase with corruption. The political risk index we use includes corruption as one of its 
components. Our result is therefore consistent with their model and their empirical evidence. There is no 
clear relation between creditor rights and systematic risk across the various regressions, but systematic 
risk increases sharply with the anti-director index. Though the relation between systematic risk and stock 
market development measures is ambiguous, there is a strong negative relation between bond market 
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development and systematic risk. Systematic risk falls with capital account openness in all the regressions, 
but generally increases with equity market openness. The relation between patents and systematic risk is 
ambiguous, as it is negative for some regressions and positive for others. Systematic risk falls with the 
disclosure index. 
The coefficients on the firm-level variables are generally of the same sign for the systematic risk 
regressions as for the idiosyncratic risk regressions. A key difference between the systematic risk 
regressions and the idiosyncratic volatility regressions is that the percent zero returns and the market 
coverage variables are much more economically significant in the systematic risk regressions, suggesting 
that liquidity and selection issues are more important for the estimation of systematic risk. 
IV. Idiosyncratic	Volatility,	Systematic	Risk,	and	R2	
Following Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), a large literature has developed that focuses on explaining 
why R2 differs across countries or within countries. A firm’s R2 is simply the square of its systematic risk 
divided by the square of its total risk. As a result, there are two sources of variation in R2: systematic risk 
and idiosyncratic risk. Consequently, R2 can fall because systematic risk falls or because total risk 
increases for constant systematic risk. An increase in total risk not accompanied by an increase in 
systematic risk is an increase in idiosyncratic risk. It is well established that R2 falls as a country’s 
governance institutions improve. With our approach in this paper, we can contribute to this literature by 
examining whether these results hold when controlling for firm characteristics and what the R2 results tell 
us about the relation between idiosyncratic risk and a country’s institutions. Another way to put this is 
that we can address the question of whether firms with similar characteristics located in different 
countries still have R2s that are related to country characteristics. The answer is yes, but not necessarily in 
the same way as reported by the country-level literature. 
Table VIII reports results from our various regression methods with differences in the logistic 
transform of R2 as the dependent variable. The R2 literature focuses on averages of R2 over a sample 
period at the country level. Here, we let R2 change each year, and we also report results from estimations 
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at the firm level. R2 is usually negatively related to the political risk index (which would be highly 
correlated with measures of country governance used in the literature), stock market capitalization, 
patents, and disclosure; it is positively related to the anti-director index and equity market liberalization. 
The result on the anti-director index is surprising since the earlier literature (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu 
(2000)) finds that stock return synchronicity is higher with poorer investor protection in developed 
economies. However, the result is driven here by the strong relation between systematic risk and the anti-
director index. Though the literature finds a negative relation between disclosure and R2 and interprets the 
result to mean that firms in high disclosure countries have high idiosyncratic risk, we find (as reported in 
Table V) a generally negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and disclosure. The reason we find the 
same result for R2 as the literature is that systematic risk is even more strongly negatively related to 
disclosure than idiosyncratic risk (as reported in Table VII). 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
Turning to firm characteristics, we find that both the selection variable and the percent zero returns 
variable are highly significant, suggesting that liquidity and sample selection (usually ignored in other 
studies) are important determinants of synchronicity. In general, variables that are associated with 
increases in idiosyncratic risk are negatively related to R2, but there are exceptions. The major exception 
is the R&D share of investment, which is positively related to R2 even though it is strongly positively 
related to idiosyncratic risk. The reason, not surprisingly, is that it is also strongly positively related to 
systematic risk. 
V. Conclusion	
In this paper, we construct a large global data set of firms in 50 countries from 1990 to 2006. Using 
this data set, we show that the stock returns of foreign firms are less volatile than the stock returns of 
comparable U.S. firms. We then investigate why this is so. We find that this volatility difference is mostly 
attributable to foreign firms having lower idiosyncratic risk than comparable U.S. firms. The difference in 
idiosyncratic risk between foreign and comparable U.S. firms is related to both country and firm 
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characteristics. High idiosyncratic risk can result from factors that decrease welfare as well as from 
factors that increase welfare. Put differently, there is good idiosyncratic volatility and bad idiosyncratic 
volatility. Idiosyncratic volatility that results from instability or from noise trading worsens welfare. 
Idiosyncratic volatility that is the product of greater risk taking and more entrepreneurship can improve 
welfare and increase economic growth. We find that the higher idiosyncratic volatility of the U.S. is 
associated with factors that we would expect to be associated with greater economic welfare. In particular, 
we find that idiosyncratic volatility increases with investor protection, with stock market development, 
and with innovation. We also find that firm-level variables that are associated with innovation and growth 
opportunities are associated with greater idiosyncratic volatility. U.S. firms have a significantly higher 
share of R&D in the sum of capital expenditures and more R&D than comparable firms in foreign 
countries. This higher R&D share contributes to the higher idiosyncratic volatility of U.S. firms. 
It does not follow, however, that economic development and financial development are associated 
with greater volatility and that the U.S. therefore has more volatile stocks because of greater development. 
Some country characteristics that one would generally associate with higher economic and financial 
development are associated with lower volatility. In particular, we find that idiosyncratic volatility falls 
with capital account openness and with bond market development. 
Stock return volatility always draws considerable attention, and passionate arguments are often made 
about the adverse impact of some groups of investors or some institutions on volatility.  However, our 
research shows that it is not the case that high volatility for individual stocks in a country is bad or good 
by itself. If volatility is high, it is important to understand why. It can be high for reasons that are 
associated with greater economic welfare, for instance, greater incentives and ability of firms to take risks 
that lead to more innovation and growth. It can also be high for other reasons, such as political risk. 
Overall, volatility is high in the U.S. compared to the other countries for reasons that are associated with 
factors that contribute to economic growth. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
 
 
Variable Definition 
Firm Characteristics 
Total Assets The sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property, plant, and 
equipment, and other assets. 
Age Difference between year of observation and year of first listing + 1. 
Market-to-Book Value Common Equity Market Price-Year End / Book Value Per Share. 
p-score Propensity score of being a non-U.S. firm, estimated each year by 
industry. 
PPE / Total Assets Total Property Plant & Equipment (Net) divided by Total Assets. 
R&D Expense / Total Assets Research and Development (R&D) Expenses as a percent of Total Assets. 
Values are set to zero for firms with missing values. 
Capex / Total Assets Capital Expenditures (Capex) as a percent of Total Assets. Values are set 
to zero for firms with missing values. 
R&D Share R&D Expenses as a percent of the sum of R&D Expenses and Capital 
Expenditures. Values are set to zero for firms with missing values for both 
variables. 
Gross Profit Margin (3 year average) Average of up to three years (as available) of Gross Income divided by 
Net Sales or Revenues, where Gross Income is the difference between 
sales or revenues and cost of goods sold and depreciation. 
Cash / Total Assets Cash and Short-Term Investments divided by (Total Assets – Cash and 
Short-Term Investments). 
Debt Maturity Total Long-Term Debt (due in more than one year) divided by Total Debt. 
Percent Zero Returns Percentage of available firm weekly local currency returns in a year that 
equal zero (excluding leading and trailing strings of zeros). 
Total Debt Book Value of Long-Term Debt plus Short-Term Debt including all 
interest-bearing and capitalized lease obligations. 
Size Year End Market Capitalization + Total Debt + Preferred Stock. 
Preferred Stock Book Value of preferred shares outstanding. 
Leverage (Total Debt + Preferred Stock) divided by Size. 
Total Risk Annualized standard deviation of weekly stock returns measured in U.S. 
dollars. 
Systematic risk Annualized square root of difference in weekly return variance and 
variance of residuals from regressions described below for Idiosyncratic 
Risk. 
Idiosyncratic Risk Annualized standard deviation of residuals from regressions with firm 
weekly returns as the dependent variable.  Independent variables include 
world market returns, local market returns (including one lead and lag), as 
well as regional and world returns on size and book-to-market portfolios 
as in Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2010).  See equation (1) in the main 
text. 
R2 R2 from regressions described above for Idiosyncratic Risk. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Country & Other Characteristics 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity basis (thousands of USD). 
Data from the World Bank. 
ICRG Political Risk Index From PRS Group. Index measures the overall stability and quality of 
government institutions using 10 different qualitative measures such as 
internal and external conflict, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic 
quality. Higher values represent more stable and higher quality 
government institutions. 
Creditor Rights Index From Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). 
Anti-Director Rights Index From Andrei Shleifer’s website.  Revised index as described in Djankov et 
al (2008). 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio Ratio of annual trading volume to shares outstanding. Data are from the 
World Bank. 
Stock Market Capital / GDP Ratio of end-of-year stock market capitalization to Nominal GDP. Data 
are from the World Bank. 
Private Bond Market Capital / GDP Private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions and  
corporations as a share of GDP from World Bank Financial Development 
and Structure Database. Raw data are taken from the electronic version of 
the Bank of International Settlements' Quarterly Review: International 
Banking and Financial Market Developments by sector and country of 
issuer.  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).  
Disclosure Index As defined in Jin and Myers (2007), additional data from Global 
Competitiveness Reports (1999, 2000). 
Equity Market Liberalization As in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), the equity market 
liberalization intensity is measured as the percentage of the equity market 
that is investable for foreign investors. 
Capital Account Openness As in Ito and Chinn (2008), this index is based on measures of the 
presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account 
transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions, and the 
requirement to surrender export proceeds.  The index takes on higher 
values for countries that are more open to cross-border capital 
transactions.  
Patents (per MM population) Number of U.S. patents granted in the year of interest to citizens of the 
non-U.S. country dividend by the population (in millions). 
Global Growth Opportunities As described in Bekaert et al. (2007). 
Domestic Market Index Volatility Annualized standard deviation of weekly major market index returns as 
reported by Datastream. 
Market Coverage Percentage of all listed firms in a country that are in our sample. Data on 
the total number of listings comes from the World Federation of 
Exchanges (supplemented by data hand collected from individual 
exchange websites) and includes only local country listings. 
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Figure 1. Risk measures over time. This figure plots various measures of risk estimated for non-U.S. firms and their matched U.S. firm counterparts.  Panel A plots total risk, 
Panel B plots systematic risk, Panel C plots idiosyncratic risk, and Panel D plots R2.  Mean values of each group are plotted from 1991 to 2006. The number of sample 
countries increases consistently during the sample period.  Risk measures in Panels B, C, and D are determined using equation (1) in the main text. 
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Table I  
Summary Statistics by Country 
This table reports country-level median values of variables for firm-year observations in our primary data set.  Panel A reports 
values for firm-level variables, and Panel B reports values for country-level variables.  Statistics are derived from data for 1991 
to 2006 excluding firm-years with more than 30% of weekly stock returns equal to zero in the prior year.  We also eliminate 
firms with missing data for total assets, market-to-book, and firm age in the prior year.  Definitions of variables are provided in 
the Appendix. 
Panel A: Firm-Level Characteristics 
Firm- Syst- Idio- Market- Percent Cash/
year Total ematic syncratic Total to- Zero Profit Total Debt
Obs. Risk Risk Risk R2 Assets Age Book Returns Leverage Margin Assets Maturity
Argentina 424 0.416 0.262 0.294 0.404 657.1 9 0.990 0.058 0.364 0.273 0.044 0.609
Australia 5,735 0.488 0.230 0.418 0.249 30.0 8 1.723 0.096 0.079 0.136 0.112 0.725
Austria 618 0.272 0.154 0.218 0.340 652.5 8 1.389 0.058 0.358 0.202 0.077 0.643
Belgium 1,126 0.269 0.148 0.218 0.322 326.1 10 1.430 0.058 0.242 0.072 0.083 0.592
Brazil 1,142 0.489 0.318 0.347 0.440 1043.0 8 0.880 0.058 0.388 0.278 0.084 0.594
Canada 7,347 0.451 0.218 0.385 0.246 101.7 10 1.739 0.075 0.127 0.214 0.069 0.789
Chile 784 0.293 0.182 0.226 0.382 526.3 9 1.552 0.077 0.246 0.304 0.038 0.712
China 6,191 0.378 0.160 0.338 0.184 182.1 7 2.130 0.058 0.207 0.211 0.138 0.090
Colombia 161 0.376 0.256 0.250 0.472 1253.5 7 0.934 0.094 0.295 0.333 0.061 0.601
Czech Republic 92 0.424 0.242 0.318 0.314 545.3 6 0.921 0.019 0.263 0.094 0.046 0.643
Denmark 1,167 0.284 0.150 0.233 0.275 292.5 12 1.356 0.115 0.325 0.200 0.109 0.599
Egypt 187 0.393 0.221 0.318 0.324 408.7 6 1.510 0.000 0.242 0.311 0.136 0.455
Finland 1,024 0.326 0.172 0.268 0.277 196.5 6 1.537 0.077 0.249 0.227 0.086 0.707
France 6,377 0.353 0.176 0.300 0.259 167.7 7 1.645 0.038 0.253 0.112 0.104 0.588
Germany 6,156 0.376 0.191 0.320 0.260 158.8 7 1.767 0.057 0.211 0.206 0.076 0.566
Greece 2,513 0.475 0.280 0.364 0.378 89.4 7 1.802 0.019 0.200 0.236 0.052 0.233
Hong Kong 5,396 0.466 0.240 0.389 0.253 190.0 9 0.962 0.096 0.220 0.208 0.154 0.423
Hungary 189 0.395 0.235 0.281 0.379 206.0 7 1.091 0.038 0.234 0.216 0.066 0.407
India 3,671 0.491 0.282 0.391 0.329 155.7 10 1.460 0.019 0.341 0.147 0.032 0.684
Indonesia 1,196 0.543 0.336 0.406 0.419 196.5 7 1.074 0.173 0.387 0.250 0.107 0.556
Ireland 481 0.291 0.166 0.233 0.313 431.7 15 1.956 0.000 0.267 0.232 0.118 0.776
Israel 635 0.367 0.248 0.256 0.475 713.3 8 1.451 0.000 0.382 0.276 0.108 0.606
Italy 2,417 0.311 0.177 0.241 0.348 588.0 9 1.427 0.019 0.326 0.348 0.089 0.507
Japan 36,118 0.380 0.232 0.288 0.392 396.2 12 1.331 0.057 0.301 0.218 0.162 0.441
Korea (Republic of) 6,510 0.535 0.303 0.419 0.333 209.7 12 0.655 0.019 0.515 0.157 0.094 0.388
Luxembourg 116 0.285 0.154 0.229 0.308 385.4 7 1.484 0.075 0.080 0.237 0.117 0.615
Malaysia 6,822 0.411 0.229 0.322 0.327 103.2 9 1.124 0.094 0.233 0.178 0.071 0.331
Mexico 673 0.365 0.217 0.269 0.392 1279.4 8 1.370 0.000 0.216 0.316 0.074 0.724
Morocco 129 0.250 0.157 0.183 0.399 530.0 9 1.947 0.096 0.059 0.181 0.083 0.027
Netherlands 1,633 0.297 0.162 0.242 0.312 397.4 16 1.867 0.038 0.243 0.207 0.052 0.646
New Zealand 527 0.286 0.170 0.227 0.361 105.3 8 1.690 0.115 0.217 0.146 0.022 0.874
Norway 1,043 0.404 0.231 0.322 0.312 234.8 7 1.733 0.077 0.261 0.210 0.138 0.815
Pakistan 628 0.448 0.264 0.336 0.355 134.1 8 1.350 0.058 0.366 0.166 0.079 0.432
Peru 322 0.390 0.191 0.318 0.236 161.2 8 1.042 0.000 0.235 0.264 0.028 0.457
Philippines 862 0.516 0.302 0.404 0.354 264.2 8 0.963 0.154 0.307 0.267 0.065 0.527
Poland 683 0.422 0.251 0.325 0.358 113.6 5 1.329 0.058 0.198 0.186 0.074 0.499
Portugal 500 0.290 0.164 0.235 0.353 391.5 8 1.269 0.058 0.463 0.059 0.034 0.587
Russian Federation 256 0.439 0.252 0.329 0.320 1356.2 6 0.811 0.000 0.210 0.289 0.041 0.469
Singapore 2,989 0.400 0.215 0.322 0.311 124.4 7 1.252 0.113 0.200 0.166 0.136 0.403
South Africa 1,774 0.391 0.232 0.310 0.337 274.7 10 1.685 0.094 0.121 0.218 0.106 0.627
Spain 1,314 0.282 0.166 0.221 0.361 824.2 9 1.651 0.038 0.279 0.229 0.049 0.494
Sri Lanka 187 0.375 0.254 0.249 0.495 141.6 11 1.084 0.122 0.434 0.199 0.083 0.404
Sweden 2,301 0.384 0.215 0.307 0.317 102.6 7 1.976 0.075 0.137 0.154 0.114 0.813
Switzerland 1,739 0.278 0.148 0.229 0.305 450.8 12 1.353 0.077 0.289 0.234 0.136 0.721
Taiwan 6,680 0.438 0.253 0.342 0.355 155.6 6 1.246 0.057 0.257 0.171 0.123 0.309
Thailand 2,968 0.437 0.243 0.343 0.304 94.3 9 1.187 0.077 0.352 0.223 0.050 0.369
Turkey 1,634 0.595 0.416 0.388 0.557 102.7 9 1.599 0.096 0.202 0.255 0.067 0.259
United Kingdom 8,731 0.339 0.178 0.283 0.279 221.6 13 2.168 0.094 0.140 0.297 0.095 0.683
United States 55,008 0.448 0.215 0.385 0.231 224.2 10 1.915 0.038 0.171 0.308 0.094 0.815
Venezuela 123 0.559 0.382 0.349 0.543 752.8 6 0.643 0.063 0.288 0.281 0.072 0.548
All countries 0.391 0.225 0.314 0.331 229.5 8 1.408 0.058 0.247 0.217 0.083 0.588
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Table I 
 Summary Statistics by Country (continued) 
 
Panel B: Country-Level Characteristics 
Anti- Stock Market Private Capital Patents/ Equity Global Market
GDP/ ICRG Creditor Director Market Cap/ Bond Account Million Market Discl- Growth Market Index
Capita Political Rights Rights Turnover GDP Mkt/GDP Openness Popul. Liberal. osure Options Coverage Volatility
Argentina 5.5 71 1 2.0 0.121 0.296 0.076 -0.087 0.815 0.983 4.870 2.901 0.144 0.271
Australia 25.4 88 3 4.0 0.763 1.009 0.326 1.180 3.984 1.000 6.315 2.860 0.476 0.146
Austria 26.3 87 3 2.5 0.347 0.164 0.335 2.532 4.161 1.000 5.763 2.869 0.358 0.147
Belgium 24.6 83 2 3.0 0.229 0.759 0.418 2.262 4.238 1.000 5.948 2.930 0.368 0.161
Brazil 3.3 66 1 5.0 0.382 0.355 0.107 0.183 0.500 0.947 4.975 2.828 0.269 0.319
Canada 27.5 86 1 4.0 0.632 1.067 0.278 2.532 4.820 1.000 6.365 2.890 0.264 0.159
Chile 5.1 78 2 4.0 0.107 0.861 0.174 0.499 0.601 0.957 5.800 2.932 0.225 0.166
China 1.2 69 2 1.0 1.015 0.345 0.090 -1.131 0.360 0.582 3.773 0.919 0.251
Colombia 2.1 54 0 3.0 0.078 0.168 0.005 -1.131 0.178 0.000 4.435 2.913 0.083 0.200
Czech Republic 6.0 79 3 4.0 0.456 0.202 0.061 0.724 1.318 0.924 4.238 0.255 0.258
Denmark 32.5 87 3 4.0 0.672 0.556 1.082 2.532 4.568 1.000 6.213 3.040 0.412 0.168
Egypt 1.3 64 2 3.0 0.316 0.418 0.000 2.532 0.066 0.912 4.338 2.804 0.038 0.286
Finland 25.4 94 1 3.5 0.891 1.023 0.242 2.532 4.971 1.000 6.450 3.250 0.665 0.276
France 24.0 78 0 3.5 0.811 0.785 0.411 2.532 4.127 1.000 5.898 2.982 0.631 0.163
Germany 25.8 86 3 3.5 1.226 0.435 0.469 2.532 4.888 1.000 6.040 2.964 0.602 0.185
Greece 12.2 78 1 2.0 0.437 0.578 0.012 1.991 0.986 1.000 4.873 2.856 0.812 0.199
Hong Kong 24.2 78 4 5.0 0.503 3.674 0.175 2.532 4.483 1.000 5.818 0.542 0.176
Hungary 6.6 81 1 2.0 0.738 0.223 0.021 1.721 1.769 0.989 5.025 0.377 0.291
India 0.5 62 2 5.0 1.130 0.351 0.006 -1.131 0.227 0.566 4.778 2.925 0.385 0.253
Indonesia 1.0 52 2 4.0 0.428 0.269 0.017 1.180 0.064 0.874 4.173 2.832 0.318 0.273
Ireland 25.5 89 1 5.0 0.563 0.569 0.084 2.532 3.611 1.000 5.605 2.907 0.344 0.176
Israel 17.2 62 3 4.0 0.553 0.596 0.000 2.262 5.084 0.991 5.708 2.965 0.145 0.244
Italy 20.8 78 2 2.0 1.040 0.416 0.343 2.532 3.503 1.000 5.135 2.885 0.701 0.179
Japan 34.2 84 2 4.5 0.693 0.736 0.454 2.532 5.552 1.000 5.553 3.013 0.643 0.208
Korea (Republic of) 12.2 76 3 4.5 2.095 0.561 0.571 -0.087 4.445 0.945 4.748 2.948 0.778 0.311
Luxembourg 46.2 93 0 2.0 0.011 1.447 0.000 0.000 4.698 1.000 5.973 0.041 0.169
Malaysia 4.2 74 3 5.0 0.319 1.429 0.519 -0.087 1.267 0.924 5.145 2.922 0.738 0.127
Mexico 6.1 72 0 3.0 0.289 0.255 0.097 1.180 0.653 0.980 4.640 2.976 0.221 0.228
Morocco 1.4 72 1 2.0 0.096 0.383 0.000 -1.131 0.033 0.905 2.806 0.291 0.172
Netherlands 25.3 89 3 2.5 1.007 1.046 0.459 2.532 4.492 1.000 6.098 3.013 0.451 0.163
New Zealand 18.6 88 4 4.0 0.399 0.392 0.000 2.532 3.737 1.000 6.030 2.965 0.288 0.145
Norway 42.0 89 2 3.5 0.859 0.388 0.209 2.532 4.035 1.000 5.830 2.858 0.463 0.211
Pakistan 0.5 49 1 4.0 3.227 0.163 0.000 -1.131 0.012 0.000 2.783 0.048 0.281
Peru 2.2 63 0 3.5 0.089 0.244 0.037 2.532 0.111 0.845 4.615 0.122 0.160
Philippines 1.0 67 1 4.0 0.238 0.467 0.003 0.137 0.211 0.477 4.603 2.972 0.354 0.228
Poland 5.4 75 1 2.0 0.362 0.179 0.000 0.137 0.404 0.986 4.675 0.404 0.244
Portugal 11.3 86 1 2.5 0.521 0.373 0.238 2.532 0.769 1.000 5.118 2.889 0.292 0.168
Russian Federation 4.0 66 2 4.0 0.395 0.425 0.000 -0.087 0.804 0.646 3.793 0.146 0.304
Singapore 23.1 86 3 5.0 0.508 1.597 0.187 2.532 4.493 1.000 5.943 2.981 0.517 0.182
South Africa 3.4 69 3 5.0 0.400 1.625 0.116 -1.131 1.346 0.998 5.450 2.905 0.386 0.245
Spain 15.2 81 2 5.0 1.628 0.680 0.161 2.532 2.120 1.000 5.648 2.850 0.487 0.162
Sri Lanka 0.8 54 2 4.0 0.148 0.131 0.000 0.137 0.141 0.000 2.888 0.066 0.193
Sweden 28.4 90 1 3.5 1.104 1.098 0.424 2.532 5.046 1.000 6.315 2.994 0.828 0.199
Switzerland 37.7 89 1 3.0 0.929 2.182 0.410 2.532 5.253 1.000 5.713 3.047 0.372 0.152
Taiwan 13.0 77 2 3.0 1.752 1.074 0.265 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.415 1.000
Thailand 2.5 69 2 4.0 0.743 0.643 0.126 -0.087 0.357 0.558 4.255 2.892 0.570 0.255
Turkey 3.5 64 2 3.0 1.546 0.277 0.000 -1.131 0.189 0.982 5.110 2.849 0.550 0.411
United Kingdom 25.0 85 4 5.0 0.777 1.342 0.162 2.532 4.213 1.000 6.348 2.994 0.268 0.151
United States 35.5 83 1 3.0 1.256 1.320 1.052 2.532 5.595 1.000 6.553 3.046 0.670 0.146
Venezuela 4.0 60 3 1.0 0.102 0.067 0.006 -0.049 0.806 0.616 3.725 2.836 0.117 0.322
All countries 12.2 78 2 3.5 0.537 0.512 0.1211 2.126 1.346 0.999 5.45 2.913 0.374 0.199
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Table II  
Matched Sample Tests 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) values for characteristics of non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms. Annual values for each non-U.S. 
firm (and its matched U.S. firm(s)) are averaged so that each non-U.S. firm appears only once. Variables are created using USD-denominated data. Firms with more than 
30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous period are excluded. Matching is performed one year prior to the observation year by industry. The first 
part reports values for variables used in propensity score matching including the propensity scores. The second part reports values for the primary firm-level variables. 
The third part reports values for country-level variables. Not all variables are available for all firms.  We do not report standard deviations for matched U.S. firms for the 
country variables with no time-series variation.  For the firm-level variables, p-values from t-tests and Wilcoxon tests for differences in samples are reported in the last 
two columns. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Non-U.S. Matched U.S.
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Means Medians t-Test Wilcoxon
Matching Characteristics
  Total Assets (log) 4.902 4.771 1.941 5.496 5.578 1.454 -0.594 -0.806 <0.001 <0.001
  Age (log) 1.750 1.835 0.851 2.022 2.093 0.637 -0.271 -0.258 <0.001 <0.001
  Market-to-Book 2.435 1.719 2.370 2.344 1.987 1.658 0.092 -0.268 <0.001 <0.001
  P-score 0.778 0.812 0.138 0.778 0.812 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.927 0.868
Firm Characteristics
  Leverage 0.267 0.231 0.224 0.262 0.251 0.152 0.005 -0.020 0.005 <0.001
  PPE / Total Assets  0.314 0.283 0.229 0.269 0.244 0.168 0.045 0.039 <0.001 <0.001
  R&D Expense / Total Assets 0.011 0.000 0.046 0.031 0.005 0.062 -0.019 -0.005 <0.001 <0.001
  CapEx / Total Assets 0.057 0.039 0.061 0.050 0.042 0.041 0.007 -0.002 <0.001 <0.001
  R&D Share 0.104 0.000 0.212 0.178 0.085 0.218 -0.074 -0.085 <0.001 <0.001
  Gross Profit Margin (3 yr ave.) 0.220 0.210 0.248 0.270 0.272 0.178 -0.050 -0.062 <0.001 <0.001
  Cash / Total Assets  0.344 0.138 0.824 0.427 0.158 0.797 -0.083 -0.019 <0.001 <0.001
  Debt Maturity 0.453 0.455 0.293 0.716 0.748 0.207 -0.263 -0.293 <0.001 <0.001
  Percent Zero Returns 0.089 0.073 0.064 0.051 0.048 0.035 0.038 0.025 <0.001 <0.001
Country Characteristics
  ICRG Political Risk 78.621 82.200 8.570 82.083 82.143 1.362 -3.461 0.057
  Creditor Rights 2.277 2.000 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.277 1.000
  Anti-Director Rights Index 3.900 4.000 1.112 3.000 3.000 0.900 1.000
  Stock Market Turnover Ratio 0.922 0.806 0.526 1.475 1.505 0.205 -0.553 -0.699
  Stock Market Capital / GDP 1.010 0.798 0.743 1.307 1.316 0.100 -0.297 -0.518
  Private Bond Market Capital / GDP  0.295 0.279 0.185 1.076 1.103 0.086 -0.781 -0.824
  Disclosure  5.476 5.553 0.742 6.553 6.553 -1.076 -1.000
  Equity Market Liberalization  0.924 1.000 0.162 1.000 1.000 -0.076 0.000
  Capital Account Openness 1.434 2.352 1.373 2.532 2.532 -1.098 -0.180
  Patents / Million Population (log) 3.488 4.226 1.966 5.595 5.565 0.863 -2.107 -1.339
  Domestic Market Index Volatility (log) -1.639 -1.630 0.279 -2.028 -2.032 0.188 0.389 0.402
  Global Growth Opportunities 2.947 2.949 0.100 3.057 3.100 0.083 -0.110 -0.151
Differences Tests
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Table III  
Matched Sample Tests of Risk Measures 
 
This table reports mean, median, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) values for risk characteristics of non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms. Annual 
values for each non-U.S. firm (and its matched U.S. firm(s)) are averaged so that each non-U.S. firm appears only once in each grouping. Variables 
are created using USD-denominated data. Matching is performed one year prior to the observation year by industry. p-values from t-tests and 
Wilcoxon tests for differences in samples are reported in the last two columns. Panel A reports values for all firms and segmented by stage of 
economic development. Panel B reports differences by different screens for trading activity (i.e., percent of local currency returns equal to zero).  
The sum of observations for developing and developed countries in Panel A exceeds the number of observations for all countries because some 
countries change from developing to developed during our sample.  However, only data for the correct classification are used in calculating 
averages for the 461 firms that appear in both groupings. 
 
Panel A: Differences in Risk Measures 
Non-U.S. Matched U.S.
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Means Medians t-test Wilcoxon
All Countries
  Total Risk 20,069 0.557 0.460 0.558 0.700 0.588 0.707 -0.143 -0.128 <0.001 <0.001
  Systematic Risk 20,065 0.301 0.254 0.300 0.328 0.283 0.318 -0.027 -0.028 <0.001 <0.001
  Idiosyncratic Risk 20,065 0.468 0.377 0.495 0.618 0.510 0.647 -0.150 -0.133 <0.001 <0.001
  R2 20,065 0.312 0.298 0.118 0.266 0.261 0.075 0.046 0.037 <0.001 <0.001
Developed Countries
  Total Risk 12,968 0.566 0.455 0.584 0.714 0.601 0.716 -0.148 -0.145 <0.001 <0.001
  Systematic Risk 12,964 0.294 0.250 0.284 0.336 0.287 0.328 -0.042 -0.037 <0.001 <0.001
  Idiosyncratic Risk 12,964 0.484 0.372 0.527 0.630 0.522 0.653 -0.146 -0.150 <0.001 <0.001
  R2 12,964 0.310 0.295 0.113 0.264 0.260 0.074 0.046 0.035 <0.001 <0.001
Developing Countries
  Total Risk 7,563 0.543 0.468 0.511 0.673 0.558 0.701 -0.130 -0.091 <0.001 <0.001
  Systematic Risk 7,562 0.316 0.263 0.328 0.314 0.271 0.308 0.003 -0.008 0.336 0.003
  Idiosyncratic Risk 7,562 0.442 0.381 0.429 0.596 0.484 0.644 -0.154 -0.103 <0.001 <0.001
  R2 7,562 0.321 0.307 0.129 0.269 0.263 0.077 0.051 0.044 <0.001 <0.001
Differences Tests
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Table III  
Matched Sample Tests of Risk Measures (continued) 
 
Panel B: Differences in Risk Measures by Zero Return Thresholds 
Non-U.S. Matched U.S.
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. Means Medians t-test Wilcoxon
Total Risk
  No Zero Return Screen 21,316 0.570 0.467 0.581 0.769 0.657 0.749 -0.199 -0.189 <0.001 <0.001
  <30% Zero Returns 20,069 0.557 0.460 0.558 0.700 0.588 0.707 -0.143 -0.128 <0.001 <0.001
  <10% Zero Returns 17,487 0.537 0.449 0.540 0.630 0.520 0.656 -0.093 -0.071 <0.001 <0.001
Systematic Risk
  No Zero Return Screen 21,312 0.299 0.255 0.286 0.350 0.304 0.332 -0.051 -0.049 <0.001 <0.001
  <30% Zero Returns 20,065 0.301 0.254 0.300 0.328 0.283 0.318 -0.027 -0.028 <0.001 <0.001
  <10% Zero Returns 17,485 0.303 0.254 0.316 0.312 0.262 0.320 -0.009 -0.008 <0.001 <0.001
Idiosyncratic Risk
  No Zero Return Screen 21,312 0.484 0.385 0.524 0.684 0.575 0.682 -0.199 -0.191 <0.001 <0.001
  <30% Zero Returns 20,065 0.468 0.377 0.495 0.618 0.510 0.647 -0.150 -0.133 <0.001 <0.001
  <10% Zero Returns 17,485 0.444 0.362 0.471 0.548 0.445 0.590 -0.104 -0.083 <0.001 <0.001
R2
  No Zero Return Screen 21,312 0.306 0.287 0.116 0.255 0.251 0.068 0.050 0.036 <0.001 <0.001
  <30% Zero Returns 20,065 0.312 0.298 0.118 0.266 0.261 0.075 0.046 0.037 <0.001 <0.001
  <10% Zero Returns 17,485 0.331 0.321 0.124 0.282 0.276 0.084 0.049 0.045 <0.001 <0.001
Differences Tests
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Table IV 
Matched Sample Tests over Time 
This table reports mean differences in risk characteristics of non-U.S. firms and matched U.S. firms by year and subperiod. Variables are 
created using USD denominated data. Firms with more than 30% of local currency stock returns equal to zero in the previous year are 
excluded.  Matching is performed one year prior to the observation year by industry. p-values from t-tests for differences in means are 
also reported. 
 
Mean Diff p-value Mean Diff p-value Mean Diff p-value Mean Diff p-value
1991 -0.090 <0.001 0.002 0.437 -0.105 <0.001 0.108 <0.001
1992 0.014 0.013 0.083 <0.001 -0.044 <0.001 0.196 <0.001
1993 0.015 0.006 0.076 <0.001 -0.033 <0.001 0.198 <0.001
1994 0.002 0.696 0.053 <0.001 -0.032 <0.001 0.119 <0.001
1995 -0.029 <0.001 0.046 <0.001 -0.062 <0.001 0.168 <0.001
1996 -0.070 <0.001 -0.002 0.277 -0.080 <0.001 0.080 <0.001
1997 0.086 <0.001 0.150 <0.001 0.001 0.881 0.147 <0.001
1998 0.085 <0.001 0.170 <0.001 -0.026 <0.001 0.122 <0.001
1999 -0.110 <0.001 0.026 <0.001 -0.141 <0.001 0.092 <0.001
2000 -0.218 <0.001 -0.109 <0.001 -0.189 <0.001 0.036 <0.001
2001 -0.256 <0.001 -0.089 <0.001 -0.249 <0.001 0.044 <0.001
2002 -0.374 <0.001 -0.112 <0.001 -0.365 <0.001 0.064 <0.001
2003 -0.269 <0.001 -0.083 <0.001 -0.261 <0.001 0.029 <0.001
2004 -0.182 <0.001 -0.045 <0.001 -0.185 <0.001 0.067 <0.001
2005 -0.176 <0.001 -0.059 <0.001 -0.168 <0.001 0.024 <0.001
2006 -0.065 <0.001 0.008 <0.001 -0.080 <0.001 0.087 <0.001
1991-1999 -0.008 0.003 0.081 <0.001 -0.063 <0.001 0.130 <0.001
2000-2006 -0.219 <0.001 -0.068 <0.001 -0.214 <0.001 0.052 <0.001
Total Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk R2
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Table V 
Idiosyncratic Risk Regressions 
This table reports values from firm-level regressions with log-differences in idiosyncratic risk as the dependent variables.  
The first set of results is from Fama-MacBeth style regressions. Regressions are estimated at the firm-level annually with 
the independent variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the 
relation over time (1992-2006), and these values are reported in the table with corresponding p-values. Standard errors are 
corrected with the Newey-West (1987) procedure. The second column reports summary results from many Fama-MacBeth 
style regressions where only one country variable is included in each regression. The firm-level results are average 
coefficients and p-values across the many regressions.  The third set of results represents coefficient estimates from a 
single cross-sectional regression, where each firm enters the sample only once using average characteristics of each firm.  
The last set of results is from weighted least squares panel regressions estimated using the Yule-Walker method to account 
for autocorrelation.  Estimation is done with weighting by the inverse of the annual number of firms to adjust for changing 
sample size. The regression includes year fixed effects (not reported). In all regressions the explanatory variables are 
lagged and standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so that the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect 
on risk of a one-standard deviation move in the explanatory variable. Risk variables are measured as log differences 
between non-U.S. firms and their matching U.S. firms. For Fama-MacBeth style regressions the values for Observations 
and Adjusted R2 are the averages across the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
ICRG Political -0.019 0.15 -0.062 <0.01 -0.034 <0.01 0.010 0.04
Creditor Rights -0.001 0.78 0.016 0.01 0.002 0.66 0.001 0.78
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.025 0.09 0.024 0.05 0.000 0.95 0.018 <0.01
Stock Market Turnover 0.021 0.02 0.024 0.03 0.026 <0.01 0.009 0.01
Stock Market Capital (%GDP) 0.020 0.13 0.026 <0.01 0.043 <0.01 0.035 <0.01
Private Bond Market (%GDP) -0.022 <0.01 -0.052 <0.01 -0.025 <0.01 -0.045 <0.01
Capital Account Openness -0.031 0.01 -0.064 <0.01 -0.021 <0.01 -0.033 <0.01
Patents (log per million pop.) 0.033 <0.01 -0.003 0.76 0.024 <0.01 0.034 <0.01
Equity Market Liberalization 0.017 0.10 -0.006 0.58 -0.018 <0.01 0.000 0.93
Disclosure -0.046 0.05 -0.057 <0.01 -0.008 0.44 -0.038 <0.01
PPE / Total Assets -0.058 <0.01 -0.052 <0.01 -0.061 <0.01 -0.064 <0.01
Profitability (3-yr ave.) -0.070 <0.01 -0.067 <0.01 -0.075 <0.01 -0.079 <0.01
Cash & STI (% Total Assets) 0.035 <0.01 0.035 <0.01 0.018 <0.01 0.028 <0.01
Debt Maturity -0.035 <0.01 -0.043 <0.01 -0.027 <0.01 -0.044 <0.01
R&D Share 0.045 <0.01 0.040 <0.01 0.048 <0.01 0.050 <0.01
Percent Zero Returns -0.017 0.03 -0.020 0.02 -0.017 <0.01 -0.014 <0.01
Total Assets (log) -0.263 <0.01 -0.266 <0.01 -0.264 <0.01 -0.330 <0.01
Age (log) -0.109 <0.01 -0.113 <0.01 -0.049 <0.01 -0.089 <0.01
Market-To-Book 0.003 0.61 0.003 0.58 0.011 0.02 0.017 <0.01
Leverage 0.202 <0.01 0.206 <0.01 0.152 <0.01 0.215 <0.01
Market Coverage -0.001 0.93 -0.008 0.25 -0.014 0.02 -0.009 0.02
Intercept -0.143 <0.01 -0.143 <0.01 -0.113 <0.01 -0.043 0.01
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.380 0.412 0.387
Observations 5,824 5,824 15,293 93,225
Variables Variable Cross-Section Yule-Walker
Fama-MacBeth Fama MacBeth
All-Country One-Country Single Panel with
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Table VI 
Robustness Tests for Idiosyncratic Risk Regressions 
This table reports values from firm-level regressions with log-differences in idiosyncratic risk as the dependent variables. Specification (1) includes the country-level 
global growth opportunities (GGO) variable from Bekaert et al(2007). Specification (2) includes a dummy variable for firms with an ADR listing in the year of 
observation as well as interactions between the ADR dummy variable and country-level variables (denoted “*ADR”).  Specification (3) is limited to firm-years with 
fewer than 10% zero returns.  Specification (4) includes firms with no screen on the number of zero returns.  Specification (5) excludes financial firms.  Specification 
(6) is based on firm matching only by year, industry, and firm size. All results are from Fama-MacBeth style regressions. Regressions are estimated at the firm level 
annually with the independent variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the relation over time (1992-2006), 
and these values are reported in the table with corresponding p-values (values reported as 0.00 are less than 0.005). Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West 
(1987) procedure.  In all regressions the explanatory variables are lagged and standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so that the magnitude of 
coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one-standard deviation move in the explanatory variable. Equity Market Liberalization and Patents are orthogonalized with 
respect to GDP per capita. Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the log difference between non-U.S. firms and the matching U.S. firms. The values for Observations and 
Adjusted R2 are the averages across the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Coef. p -val Coef. p -val *ADR p -val Coef. p -val Coef. p -val Coef. p -val Coef. p -val
ICRG Political -0.001 0.95 -0.019 0.17 -0.003 0.40 -0.015 0.16 -0.017 0.30 -0.015 0.26 -0.020 0.16
Creditor Rights -0.007 0.26 -0.002 0.80 -0.008 0.40 0.009 0.17 -0.009 0.11 -0.004 0.33 -0.001 0.82
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.036 <0.01 0.026 0.08 -0.006 0.44 0.027 0.06 0.026 0.08 0.024 0.10 0.026 0.08
Stock Market Turnover 0.020 0.03 0.021 0.04 0.003 0.53 0.023 0.02 0.020 0.02 0.024 0.01 0.022 0.02
Stock Market Capital (%GDP) -0.010 0.44 0.016 0.11 0.016 0.02 0.024 0.01 0.022 0.15 0.016 0.20 0.023 0.06
Private Bond Market (%GDP) -0.013 0.07 -0.024 0.01 0.071 <0.01 -0.011 0.33 -0.029 <0.01 -0.022 0.01 -0.021 0.01
Capital Account Openness -0.039 <0.01 -0.030 0.02 0.002 0.58 -0.039 <0.01 -0.025 0.05 -0.033 0.01 -0.029 0.02
Global Growth Opportunities -0.005 0.53
Patents (log per million pop.) 0.035 <0.01 0.036 <0.01 -0.015 0.01 0.039 <0.01 0.030 <0.01 0.033 <0.01 0.035 <0.01
Equity Market Liberalization 0.030 0.02 0.017 0.13 0.001 0.88 0.024 0.02 0.016 0.17 0.017 0.10 0.024 0.01
Disclosure -0.050 0.04 -0.048 0.03 0.013 0.29 -0.039 0.07 -0.052 0.06 -0.041 0.10 -0.051 0.02
PPE / Total Assets -0.056 <0.01 -0.057 <0.01 -0.052 <0.01 -0.063 <0.01 -0.048 <0.01 -0.051 <0.01
Profitability (3-yr ave.) -0.068 <0.01 -0.069 <0.01 -0.057 <0.01 -0.064 <0.01 -0.064 <0.01 -0.056 <0.01
Cash & STI (% Total Assets) 0.034 <0.01 0.034 <0.01 0.044 <0.01 0.030 <0.01 0.037 <0.01 0.041 <0.01
Debt Maturity -0.038 <0.01 -0.036 <0.01 -0.029 <0.01 -0.036 <0.01 -0.039 <0.01 -0.027 <0.01
R&D Share 0.044 <0.01 0.044 <0.01 0.044 <0.01 0.045 <0.01 0.044 <0.01 0.051 <0.01
Percent Zero Returns -0.018 0.01 -0.016 0.03 -0.016 0.01 -0.048 <0.01 -0.016 0.02 -0.015 0.04
Total Assets (log) -0.266 <0.01 -0.268 <0.01 -0.260 <0.01 -0.292 <0.01 -0.263 <0.01 -0.161 <0.01
Age (log) -0.107 <0.01 -0.108 <0.01 -0.111 <0.01 -0.102 <0.01 -0.109 <0.01 -0.106 <0.01
Market-To-Book 0.006 0.38 0.004 0.53 0.002 0.67 0.002 0.66 0.004 0.55 0.020 0.01
Leverage 0.204 <0.01 0.203 <0.01 0.177 <0.01 0.213 <0.01 0.204 <0.01 0.206 <0.01
ADR Dummy 0.527 <0.01
Market Coverage -0.007 0.49 0.004 0.74 -0.005 0.54 -0.009 0.37 -0.003 0.80 -0.003 0.79 -0.009 0.47
Intercept -0.156 <0.01 -0.171 <0.01 -0.109 <0.01 -0.177 <0.01 -0.148 <0.01 -0.141 <0.01
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.409 0.404 0.381 0.408 0.294
Observations 5195 5824 4251 6732 5610 5859
(5) (6)(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table VII 
Systematic Risk Regressions 
This table reports values from firm-level regressions with log-differences in systematic risk as the dependent variables. The first 
set of results is from Fama-MacBeth style regressions. Regressions are estimated at the firm level annually with the independent 
variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the relation over time (1992-
2006), and these values are reported in the table with corresponding p-values. Standard errors are corrected with the Newey-West 
(1987) procedure. The second column reports summary results from many Fama-MacBeth style regressions where only one 
country variable is included in each regression. The firm-level results are average coefficients and p-values across the many 
regressions.  The third set of results represents coefficient estimates form a single cross-sectional regression where each firm enters 
the sample only once using average characteristics of each firm. The last set of results is from weighted least squares panel 
regressions estimated using the Yule-Walker method to account for autocorrelation. Estimation is done with weighting by the 
inverse of the annual number of firms to adjust for changing sample size. The regression includes year fixed effects (not reported). 
In all regressions the explanatory variables are lagged and standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation so that the 
magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one-standard deviation move in the explanatory variable.  Risk variables 
are measured as log differences between non-U.S. firms and their matching U.S. firms. For Fama-MacBeth style regressions the 
values for Observations and Adjusted R2 are the averages across the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions are provided 
in the Appendix. 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
ICRG Political -0.028 0.07 -0.113 <0.01 -0.053 <0.01 -0.017 0.02
Creditor Rights 0.018 0.37 0.022 0.02 -0.016 <0.01 -0.010 0.02
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.072 <0.01 0.061 <0.01 0.128 <0.01 0.115 <0.01
Stock Market Turnover -0.003 0.85 0.015 0.19 0.066 <0.01 0.015 <0.01
Stock Market Capital (%GDP) -0.012 0.39 0.022 0.17 -0.009 0.11 -0.009 0.06
Private Bond Market (%GDP) -0.032 <0.01 -0.088 <0.01 -0.029 <0.01 -0.051 <0.01
Capital Account Openness -0.060 0.01 -0.105 <0.01 0.026 <0.01 -0.016 0.01
Patents (log, per million pop.) 0.032 0.05 -0.033 0.05 -0.050 <0.01 -0.009 0.11
Equity Market Liberalization 0.086 <0.01 0.019 0.43 0.044 <0.01 0.039 <0.01
Disclosure -0.098 0.08 -0.093 <0.01 -0.028 0.02 -0.060 <0.01
PPE / Total Assets -0.059 <0.01 -0.049 <0.01 -0.054 <0.01 -0.063 <0.01
Profitability (3-yr ave.) -0.067 <0.01 -0.062 <0.01 -0.072 <0.01 -0.079 <0.01
Cash & STI (% Total Assets) 0.045 <0.01 0.041 <0.01 0.035 <0.01 0.035 <0.01
Debt Maturity -0.032 <0.01 -0.043 <0.01 -0.019 <0.01 -0.036 <0.01
R&D Share 0.069 <0.01 0.067 <0.01 0.071 <0.01 0.070 <0.01
Percent Zero Returns -0.065 <0.01 -0.073 <0.01 -0.075 <0.01 -0.064 <0.01
Total Assets (log) -0.103 <0.01 -0.109 <0.01 -0.128 <0.01 -0.151 <0.01
Age (log) -0.087 <0.01 -0.093 <0.01 -0.034 <0.01 -0.078 <0.01
Market-To-Book 0.024 <0.01 0.023 0.01 0.025 <0.01 0.033 <0.01
Leverage 0.153 <0.01 0.162 <0.01 0.113 <0.01 0.158 <0.01
Market Coverage 0.068 0.01 0.048 0.03 0.021 <0.01 0.035 <0.01
Intercept 0.103 0.08 0.103 0.09 -0.004 0.28 0.410 <0.01
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.189 0.232 0.187
Observations 5,824 5,824 15,293 93,225
Variables Variable Cross-Section Yule-Walker
Fama-MacBeth Fama MacBeth
All-Country One-Country Single Panel with
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Table VIII  
R2 Differences 
This table reports values from firm-level regressions with log differences in R2 as the dependent variables. The first set of 
results is from Fama-MacBeth style regressions. Regressions are estimated at the firm level annually with the independent 
variables listed in the first column. Using these estimated coefficients a second regression determines the relation over time 
(1992-2006); these values are reported in the table with corresponding p-values. Standard errors are corrected with the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure. The second column reports summary results from many Fama-MacBeth style regressions 
where only one country variable is included in each regression. The firm-level results are average coefficients and p-values 
across the many regressions. The third set of results represents coefficient estimates form a single cross-sectional regression 
where each firm enters the sample only once using average characteristics of each firm. The last set of results is from 
weighted least squares panel regressions estimated using the Yule-Walker method to account for autocorrelation.  
Estimation is done with weighting by the inverse of the annual number of firms to adjust for changing sample size. The 
regression includes year fixed effects (not reported). In all regressions the explanatory variables are lagged and standardized 
to mean zero and unit standard deviation so the magnitude of coefficients represents the effect on risk of a one-standard 
deviation move in the explanatory variable.  Risk variables are measured as log differences between non-U.S. firms and 
their matching U.S. firms. For Fama-MacBeth style regressions the values for Observations and Adjusted R2 are the 
averages across the cross-sectional regressions. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value Coef. p -value
ICRG Political -0.010 0.44 -0.056 <0.01 -0.021 0.01 -0.031 <0.01
Creditor Rights 0.021 0.30 0.006 0.49 -0.020 <0.01 -0.011 <0.01
Anti-Director Rights Index 0.052 0.01 0.040 <0.01 0.141 <0.01 0.106 <0.01
Stock Market Turnover -0.026 0.03 -0.010 0.18 0.044 <0.01 0.005 0.23
Stock Market Capital (%GDP) -0.036 0.01 -0.004 0.72 -0.057 <0.01 -0.050 <0.01
Private Bond Market (%GDP) -0.011 0.18 -0.040 0.01 -0.004 0.46 -0.007 0.16
Capital Account Openness -0.032 0.07 -0.046 0.03 0.052 <0.01 0.018 <0.01
Patents (log, per million pop.) -0.001 0.96 -0.033 0.01 -0.082 <0.01 -0.044 <0.01
Equity Market Liberalization 0.076 <0.01 0.027 0.16 0.068 <0.01 0.043 <0.01
Disclosure -0.057 0.14 -0.040 0.06 -0.022 0.02 -0.022 <0.01
PPE / Total Assets -0.001 0.80 0.003 0.50 0.008 0.02 -0.001 0.77
Profitability (3-yr ave.) 0.003 0.44 0.006 0.22 0.004 0.29 0.000 0.80
Cash & STI (% Total Assets) 0.011 0.01 0.008 0.14 0.019 <0.01 0.008 <0.01
Debt Maturity 0.004 0.32 0.000 0.66 0.009 0.01 0.010 <0.01
R&D Share 0.026 <0.01 0.030 <0.01 0.026 <0.01 0.023 <0.01
Percent Zero Returns -0.053 <0.01 -0.058 <0.01 -0.063 <0.01 -0.055 <0.01
Total Assets (log) 0.177 <0.01 0.173 <0.01 0.150 <0.01 0.200 <0.01
Age (log) 0.024 <0.01 0.022 <0.01 0.017 <0.01 0.012 <0.01
Market-To-Book 0.022 <0.01 0.022 <0.01 0.016 <0.01 0.018 <0.01
Leverage -0.054 <0.01 -0.048 <0.01 -0.043 <0.01 -0.063 <0.01
Market Coverage 0.076 <0.01 0.061 <0.01 0.039 <0.01 0.048 <0.01
Intercept 0.272 <0.01 0.272 <0.01 0.120 <0.01 0.506 <0.01
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.202 0.365 0.201
Observations 5,824 5,824 15,293 93,225
Single
Cross-Section
Panel with
Yule-Walker
Fama-MacBeth
All-Country
Variables
Fama MacBeth
One-Country
Variable
 
